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KEY FINDINGS 
Differential taxation of electricity based on production methods or on the 
CO2 content of electricity may raise discrimination concerns under WTO 
law, EU law and Switzerland – EEC 1972 FTA. However, to the extent 
that differentiated taxation constitutes part of a comprehensive domestic 
tax system and is applied equally to imported and domestic electricity, it 
can pass the test on non-discrimination under substantive rules or be justi-
fied under environmental exceptions of Art. XX of the WTO’s General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Switzerland–EEC 1972 
FTA sets tighter constraints, as the agreement does not offer an explicit 
justification similar to GATT in the field of taxation. The lawfulness of 
differentiated taxation of electricity will depend on the modalities of tax, 
also avoiding that it amounts to a domestic subsidy in effect. While Swit-
zerland is not bound by EU law, it may have an interest in aligning its own 
legislation with selected aspects of EU law. Apart from non-discrimination 
provisions, EU law also contains a number of specific regulations relevant 
for the EU internal electricity market. EU Member States grant tax exemp-
tions or reductions on electricity from renewables under Council Directive 
2003/96/EC. There is an on-going debate on the introduction of a tax on 
the CO2 content of energy inputs. While risks of incompatibility with state 
aid provisions under EU law cannot be excluded, they are manageable. 
Under WTO law, EU law and the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA, it is un-
likely that a differential electricity tax will have to be readjusted for im-
ported EU electricity in order to take into account the costs incurred by EU 
electricity producers subject to the EU ETS. 
Taxing imported nuclear electricity requires a comprehensive differentiat-
ed electricity tax imposed equally on domestic and imported nuclear elec-
tricity, both under WTO law and under the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA. 
EU Member States can decide on the appropriate energy mix and adopt 
appropriate measures of public health, which enables them to tax electrici-
ty of nuclear origin at a higher rate. Nevertheless, the margin of manoeu-
vre of individual Member States in this regard is limited. 
The introduction of an import tariff on electricity from fossil fuels or nu-
clear power under WTO law requires deconsolidation of Swiss tariffs for 
electricity bound at zero per cent based on production methods according 
to Art. XXVIII GATT. Such deconsolidation is subject to compensation 
for the decreased market access for main suppliers. Under the Switzer-
land–EEC 1972 FTA, as well as under EU law, imposition of any tariffs 
on the import of electricity is prohibited and cannot be justified without 
revoking the Free Trade Agreement. As trade in electricity mainly con-
cerns neighbouring countries benefiting from obligations under the FTA, 
the introduction of import tariffs on electricity is not a legally feasible op-
tion. 
The implementation of differentiated taxation, however, creates practical 
problems in all constellations discussed. Currently EU GOs do not contain 
the necessary information for tracing the exact CO2 footprint of electricity 
from fossil fuels, and do not distinguish fossil electricity from nuclear 
electricity. This issue could be taken up in bilateral negotiations with the 
EU. 
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 1 Summaries (E/D/F) 
1.1 Executive summary  
Current Swiss legislation establishes a comprehensive framework aimed at 
bringing climate and environmental sustainability to the domestic energy 
sector. Switzerland aims to reduce generation of electricity from fossil 
fuels and from nuclear power and to increase utilization of renewable en-
ergy sources in the electricity sector. In this effort, the Federal Act on the 
Reduction of CO2 Emissions Act of December 23, 2011 (CO2 –Act, SR 
641.71) as revised is of paramount importance. The Act establishes a sys-
tem of measures aiming at the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Ac-
cording to the Act, domestic electricity producers using fossil fuels for 
electricity production have one of the following four obligations: (i) they 
have to comply by means of a 100% compensation for CO2 emissions, or 
(ii) they are obliged to participate in the emission trading scheme (ETS), or 
(iii) they can set a voluntary emission reduction target, or (iv) pay a CO2 
levy. While Swiss electricity producers have to comply with this set of 
stringent rules, electricity imported into Switzerland is not currently sub-
ject to the CO2 Act.  
The study examines three options for ways in which a more level playing 
field between domestic and imported electricity can be achieved. Under 
the first option, an electricity tax is linked to the source of electricity, tar-
geting fossil fuel electricity generation. The second option foresees the ap-
plication of a tax on imported fossil fuel electricity, based on the CO2 con-
tent of the electricity. Under the third option, Switzerland uses import tar-
iffs as an instrument to tax imported fossil fuel electricity. Finally, the 
study addresses the possibility of taxing imported electricity from nuclear 
power.  
Differential taxation of imports on the basis of Processes and Production 
Methods (PPMs) raises issues of non-discrimination. To the extent that all 
electricity is considered to be a like product independent of the methods 
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used for its production, it merits equal treatment irrespective of its origin 
and source. If green and grey electricity are considered to be unlike prod-
ucts, no discrimination against imported electricity would occur in the first 
place. In any case, domestic and imported fossil fuel based electricity have 
to be taxed equally. Thus, should Switzerland expand its production of 
grey electricity, any tax on fossil fuel electricity should be imposed equally 
on domestic and imported grey electricity.  
Taxes under WTO Law  
In the case that a differentiated tax under the first option is found to be dis-
criminatory, it can be justified under the law of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) by resorting to environmental exceptions under Art. XX of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  It is unlikely that such 
a tax needs to be readjusted for imported European Union (EU) electricity 
in order to take into account the costs incurred by EU electricity producers 
subject to the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). This is because there 
are inherent differences between the electricity tax and the emission allow-
ances obligation under the ETS. The first option may also raise subsidy is-
sues under WTO law if it causes adverse effects, e.g. impedes or displaces 
imports of electricity from fossil fuels or nuclear power. 
The legality of the second option under WTO law depends to a large ex-
tent on the exact modalities of the future general CO2 levy. To the extent 
that the domestically generated power benefits from taxes imposed on im-
ported electricity, it is unlikely that such taxes on the CO2 content of im-
ported electricity could constitute a border tax adjustment (BTA) measure 
consistent with WTO rules. To legally implement a carbon BTA on elec-
tricity, the existing CO2 levy in Switzerland would have to be applied to 
domestic fossil fuel power plants without any exemptions. The considera-
tions on subsidies mentioned above equally apply to a CO2 levy. 
Taxes under EU Law  
In shaping the first and the second option for the tax, it is advisable to take 
into account EU law. An EU Member State may apply a measure of inter-
nal taxation, provided this does not result in indirect discrimination. The 
tax measure should be designed in such a way that it is in line with the 
overall objectives and the structure of the Swiss tax system in order to en-
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sure compliance with EU state aid law. Moreover, the tax rate cannot be 
set below the minimal tax rate imposed by Council Directive 2003/96/EC 
of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxa-
tion of energy products and electricity. According to the ‘output taxation 
principle’ the tax may not, as a rule, be imposed on the input energy prod-
ucts used for the production of energy. Notwithstanding, power plants are 
obliged to participate in the ETS and energy inputs may in the future also 
become subject to a CO2 levy. Under current EU law it is unclear whether 
the same principles apply to electricity from nuclear energy. Finally, a tax 
is not deemed to be a (prohibited) tariff (customs duty) or a charge having 
equivalent effect simply because it concerns a kind of energy which is not 
produced domestically. 
 Taxes under the Switzerland –EEC Free Trade Agreement 1972 
From the perspective of bilateral relations between Switzerland and the 
EU, the introduction of an electricity tax on the source of electricity under 
the first option or a CO2 levy on electricity under the second option is pos-
sible in principle, but again depends on the modalities of such a tax. Under 
the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA a new electricity tax should not result in 
direct or indirect discrimination against imports of electricity from the EU. 
The Agreement sets tighter constraints than WTO law, as it does not offer 
an explicit justification similar to Art. XX GATT in the field of taxation. 
Moreover, an electricity tax under the first option and a CO2 levy could 
raise political concerns and be complicated in terms of implementation. To 
avoid political concerns and reduce risks of discriminatory taxation of im-
ported electricity from the EU, one could think of a progressive CO2 levy 
taking into account adjustments undertaken by the EU electricity produc-
ers. There is a certain risk of finding that the suggested differentiated taxa-
tion constitutes state aid under the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA and the 
application of implicit exceptions would depend on the modalities and de-
sign of the tax.  
Taxes on Nuclear Electricity 
Taxing imported nuclear electricity requires a comprehensive differentiat-
ed electricity tax imposed equally on domestic and imported nuclear elec-
tricity, both under WTO law and under the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA. 
A CO2 levy cannot be applied to nuclear electricity, as it is based on the 
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CO2 content of electricity and nuclear electricity generation is CO2 neutral. 
EU Member States can decide on the appropriate energy mix and adopt 
appropriate measures of public health, which enable them to tax electricity 
of nuclear origin at a higher rate. Nevertheless, the margin of manoeuvre 
of individual Member States in this regard is limited. 
Import Tariffs  
The third option takes recourse to import tariffs. Under WTO law, this op-
tion would require deconsolidation of Swiss tariffs for electricity bound at 
zero per cent according to Art. XXVIII GATT. Tariff deconsolidation 
would be based on production methods. This is a new approach and has 
not been tested in practice. Moreover, it is subject to compensation for the 
decreased market access for main suppliers in another field of interest to 
them. Under EU law, as well as under the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA, 
imposition of any tariffs on the import or export of electricity is prohibited 
and cannot be justified without revoking the Free Trade Agreement. As 
trade in electricity mainly concerns neighbouring countries benefiting from 
obligations under the FTA, the introduction of import tariffs on electricity 
is not a legally feasible option. It is likely to create political problems with 
the EU, based upon the GATT law and the FTA and would necessitate re-
negotiation with the EU on this issue. 
Practical Problems of Tracing Modes of Production 
From the perspective of implementation, all three options face a challenge 
of tracing the origin of electricity. Currently, only electricity from renewa-
ble energy sources is certified by the guarantees of origin (GOs). If the im-
port of electricity is linked to a general requirement to submit a GO, there 
is a risk that this may have to be reviewed under the rules pertaining to 
non-tariff barriers to trade. In a long-term perspective the whole system of 
certification of the origin of electricity may have to be adjusted. Current 
negotiations on linking the Swiss ETS and EU ETS could be used as an 
opportunity to set up a coherent CO2 tax system, or a general electricity tax 
system, that would not discriminate in any manner against foreign electric-
ity producers. The issue of mutual recognition and equivalence of the 
compensation measures and the like could be also taken up in the current 
negotiations of the Electricity Agreement. 
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1.2 Zusammenfassung  
Das revidierte Bundesgesetz über die Reduktion der CO2 Emissionen vom 
23.12.2011 (CO2–Gesetz, SR 641.71) beinhaltet ein umfassendes Mass-
nahmenpaket, mit dem die Reduktion von Treibausgasen angestrebt wird. 
Inländische Stromproduzenten, welche fossile Brennstoffe für die Strom-
erzeugung verwenden, haben dabei eine von vier Optionen. Sie müssen 
sich entweder (i) zu einer hundertprozentigen Entschädigung für CO2 
Emissionen verpflichten oder (ii) sich am „emission trading scheme“ 
(ETS) beteiligen; oder (iii) freiwillige CO2-Emissionsreduktionsziele fest-
legen oder (iv) eine CO2-Abgabe entrichten. Während Schweizer Strom-
produzenten diesen strengen rechtlichen Anforderungen nachkommen 
müssen, unterliegt der importierte Strom dem CO2-Gesetz nicht. Vor die-
sem Hintergrund untersucht die Studie drei Möglichkeiten für die Gestal-
tung einer Steuer auf importierten Strom, welcher aus fossilen Energie-
quellen stammt. Die erste Option sieht eine Stromsteuer vor, welche an die 
Stromerzeugungsquelle (Stromerzeugung aus fossiler Energie) anknüpft. 
Gemäss der zweiten Option wird eine Steuer auf importierten Strom aus 
fossilen Energien erhoben, welche sich nach dem CO2-Gehalt des Stroms 
richtet. Unter der dritten Option werden Einfuhrzölle als Instrument ver-
wendet, um importierten Strom, welcher aus fossilen Brennstoffen stammt, 
zu besteuern. Abschliessend wird die Möglichkeit der Besteuerung von 
importiertem Strom aus Kernkraft geprüft. 
Besteuerung im Rahmen des WTO Rechts  
Die erste Option kann aus Sicht des Rechts der Welthandelsorganisation 
(WTO) mit der allgemeinen Ausnahmeregelung von Art. XX  des Allge-
meinen Zoll- und Handelsabkommen (GATT) gerechtfertigt werden, so-
weit grüner und grauer Strom rechtlich als gleichartige oder unmittelbar 
konkurrierende Ware betrachtet werden. Für den Fall, dass grüner und 
grauer Strom nicht als gleichartige Waren gelten, liegt apriori keine Dis-
kriminierung des höher besteuerten importierten Stroms vor. Im Falle ei-
nes Ausbaus der Produktion des grauen Stroms, der zu erwarten ist, müsste 
eine Steuer auf Strom aus fossilen Brennstoffen in jeden Fall in gleichem 
Mass für einheimischen wie auch für eingeführten grauen Strom einge-
führt werden. Dabei ist wenig wahrscheinlich, dass eine solche Steuer auf 
importiertem Strom die im Rahmen des EU ETS anfallenden Belastungen 
berücksichtigen muss. Dies erklärt sich durch die inhärenten Unterschiede 
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zwischen der Strombesteuerung und der Verpflichtung, Emissionszertifi-
kate im Rahmen des ETS nachzuweisen. Schliesslich wirft die die erste 
Option Fragen hinsichtlich allfälliger Subventionen unter dem WTO-
Subventionsabkommen auf, falls die Steuer sich nachteilig auswirkt, z.B. 
wenn Importe von Strom, welcher durch fossile Brennstoffe oder durch 
Kernenergie gewonnen wird, behindert oder verdrängt würden. 
Die Rechtmässigkeit der zweiten Option hängt in starkem Mass von den 
genauen Modalitäten einer zukünftigen CO2-Steuer ab. In dem Masse, wie 
die einheimische Produktion von der Steuerbelastung ausländischer Pro-
duktion profitiert, kann nicht von einer rechtmässigen Grenzausgleichs-
massnahme (GAM) ausgegangen werden. Um eine CO2-GAM für Elektri-
zität rechtmässig in Kraft zu setzen, müsste in der Schweiz ausnahmslos 
eine CO2-Abgabe auf einheimischen,  mit fossilen Brennstoffen betriebe-
nen Kraftwerken erhoben werden. Die oben gemachten Ueberlegungen zu 
den Subventionen gelten hier auch für die CO2-Abgabe. 
Besteuerung im Rahmen des EU Rechts  
Für die Ausarbeitung der ersten und zweiten Option empfiehlt es sich, die 
Rechtslage in der EU zu berücksichtigen. Im Rahmen des EU-Rechts kön-
nen EU-Mitgliedstaaten eine interne Besteuerung vorsehen, sofern diese 
nicht zu einer indirekten Diskriminierung führt. Der Steuersatz darf jedoch 
nicht unter den in der Richtlinie 2003/96/EG des Rates vom 27. Oktober 
2003 zur Restrukturierung der gemeinschaftlichen Rahmenvorschriften zur 
Besteuerung von Energieerzeugnissen und elektrischem Strom, vorgese-
henen Mindeststeuersatz angesetzt werden. Gemäss dem „Prinzip der Out-
putbesteuerung“ kann eine Abgabe in der Regel nicht auf Energieerzeug-
nisse erhoben werden, welche zur Erzeugung von Strom verwendeten 
werden. Dies trifft ungeachtet der Tatsache zu, dass Kraftwerksbetreiber 
verpflichtet sind,  am Emissionshandelssystem teilzunehmen, oder dass 
Energieeinspeisungen in Zukunft einer CO2-Abgabe unterliegen könnten. 
Unklar ist derzeit, ob unter geltendem EU-Recht dieselben Prinzipien auch 
auf Strom aus Kernkraft Anwendung finden. Eine Abgabe ist schliesslich 
weder ein (verbotener) Zoll noch eine Abgabe gleicher Wirkung, nur weil 
sie eine bestimmte Art der Energie betrifft, die im Inland nicht hergestellt 
wird. 
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Besteuerung im Rahmen des Freihandelsankommens Schweiz-EWG 
1972 
Aus der Sicht der bilateralen Verträge zwischen der Schweiz und der EU 
ist die Einführung einer Stromsteuer - je nach deren Modalität – grundsätz-
lich möglich. Sie könnte jedoch politische Bedenken aufwerfen und sich 
hinsichtlich der Umsetzung als kompliziert erweisen. Gemäss dem Frei-
handelsabkommen zwischen der Schweiz und der EWG von 1972 sollte 
eine neue Stromsteuer weder eine direkte noch indirekte Diskriminierung 
der Importe nach sich ziehen. Eine progressive CO2-Abgabe wäre denkbar, 
welche die Anpassungen seitens der EU-Stromproduzenten berücksichtigt, 
um politische Bedenken und das Diskriminierungsrisiko bei der Strombe-
steuerung von importierter Energie abzuwenden. Es besteht ein gewisses 
Risiko, dass die vorgeschlagene, differenzierte Besteuerung gemäss dem 
Freihandelsabkommen von 1972 seitens der EU als staatliche Beihilfe be-
urteilt wird. Die Anwendung impliziter Ausnahmen wird von den genauen 
Modalitäten und der Ausgestaltung der Steuer abhängen. 
Besteuerung von nuklearer Elektrizität 
Die Besteuerung von eingeführter nuklearer Elektrizität verlangt im Rah-
men einer differentiellen Besteuerung nach einer Lösung, welche gleich-
ermassen auch die Inland produzierte nukleare Elektrizität erfasst. Das 
ergibt sich sowohl aus dem WTO Recht wie auch dem Freihandelsab-
kommen von 1972. Eine CO2-Abgabe kann auf nuklearer Energie nicht 
erhoben werden, da diese CO2 neutral ist. In der EU können die Mitglied-
staaten über einen je angemessenen Energiemix entscheiden und Nuklear-
energie aus Gründen der öffentlichen Gesundheit höher besteuern. Dabei 
bleibt der Gestaltungsspielraum allerdings beschränkt.  
Erhebung von Einfuhrzöllen  
Was im Rahmen der dritten Option die Erhebung von Einfuhrzöllen be-
trifft, so könnte diese gemäss Artikel XXVIII GATT durch eine Dekonso-
lidierung der Nullzölle der Schweiz auf Elektrizität nur dann umgesetzt 
werden, wenn diese an Produktionsmethoden anknüpfen und die Kosten 
des verringerten Marktzugangs anderweitig kompensiert werden. Aus der 
Sicht des EU-Rechts und des Freihandelsabkommens von 1972 ist die Er-
hebung jeglicher Einfuhr- oder Ausfuhrsteuer untersagt und kann nicht ge-
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rechtfertigt werden ohne Kündigung des Freihandelsabkommens. Da in 
erster Linie Einfuhren aus den Nachbarstaaten betroffen wären, sind Im-
portzölle unter dem geltenden Recht keine rechtlich zulässige Option. Sie 
würde zu politischen Problemen mit der EU führen und Neuverhandlungen 
erfordern. 
Praktische Probleme beim Nachweis von Produktionsmethoden 
Für die Umsetzung bestehen für alle drei Optionen dieselben Herausforde-
rungen.  Die Rückverfolgung der Herkunft erweist sich als schwierig, weil 
zurzeit Herkunftsnachweise nur bei Strom aus erneuerbaren Energien aus-
gestellt werden. Wird Stromimport generell an die Erstellung eines Her-
kunftsnachweises gekoppelt, führt dies möglicherweise zu einer Neubeur-
teilung der Situation gemäss den Regelungen zu den nichttarifären Han-
delshemmnissen. Auf längere Sicht könnte eine Anpassung des ganzen 
Systems der Herkunftsnachweise für Strom aufdrängen. Die derzeitigen 
Verhandlungen über die Verknüpfung der Emissionshandelssysteme zwi-
schen der  Schweiz und der EU könnten dazu genutzt werden, eine kohä-
rente CO2-Abgabe einzuführen oder ein allgemeines System der Strombe-
steuerung anzuwenden, welche keine Diskriminierung für ausländische 
Stromproduzenten nach sich ziehen.  Die gegenseitige Anerkennung und 
Gleichwertigkeit von Kompensationsmassnahmen und verwandten Fragen 
könnten ebenfalls in den laufenden Verhandlungen über das Elektrizitäts-
abkommen aufgenommen werden. 
1.3 Résumé  
La Loi fédérale sur la réduction des émissions de CO2 dans sa version du 
23 décembre 2011 (Loi sur le CO2, RS 641.71) met en place un système 
compréhensif visant une réduction d’émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Se-
lon cette loi, les producteurs domestiques d’électricité provenant de com-
bustibles fossiles ont quatre  possibilités: ils peuvent (i) soit se conformer à 
l’obligation de compensation de 100% des émissions de CO2 ; (ii) soit par-
ticiper au programme d’échange de droits d’émissions; (iii) soit fixer un 
objectif facultatif de réduction d’émissions ou encore (iv) s’acquitter d’une 
contribution pour ces émissions. Tandis que les producteurs d’électricité 
suisses sont soumis à ces règlementations strictes, la loi sur le CO2 ne 
s’applique pas à l’électricité importée. Dans ce contexte, cette étude ana-
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lyse trois options possibles pour la conception d’une imposition des impor-
tations d’électricité à base de combustibles fossiles. Selon la première op-
tion, l’imposition de l’électricité serait liée à sa source, visant l’énergie à 
partir de combustibles fossiles. La deuxième option prévoit l’application 
d’un impôt en fonction de la teneur en CO2 de l’électricité importée prove-
nant de combustibles fossiles. La troisième option utilise des droits de 
douane en tant qu’instrument de perception d’impôt d’électricité de com-
bustibles fossiles. Enfin, nous abordons brièvement la possibilité de préle-
ver un impôt pour l’électricité nucléaire importée. 
Impôts dans le cadre du droit de l’OMC 
La première option est réalisable selon le droit de l’OMC en ayant recours 
aux exceptions prévues à l’article XX GATT, dans la mesure que 
l’électricité verte et l’électricité grise soient considérées comme des pro-
duits similaires ou directement concurrents. Lorsque l’électricité verte et 
l’électricité grise ne sont pas considérées comme des produits similaires, 
aucune discrimination à l’égard de l’électricité importée n’aura lieu. Si la 
Suisse compte élargir sa production d’électricité grise, ce qui semble être 
probable, un impôt prélevé sur l’électricité provenant de combustibles fos-
siles doit en tout état de cause s’appliquer de la même manière à 
l’électricité grise domestique qu’à celle qui est importée. En outre, nous 
estimons peu probable qu’un tel impôt devrait être réajusté pour 
l’électricité importée de l’UE pour tenir compte des coûts résultant aux 
producteurs d’électricité de l’UE qui sont, eux, soumis au système euro-
péen d’échange de quotas (SCEQE). Ceci est dû à des différences inhé-
rentes entre l’imposition sur l’électricité et l’obligation découlant des quo-
tas d’émissions. Enfin, en vue de l’Accord de l’OMC, la première option 
pourrait soulever des questions en lien avec des subventions dans le cas 
que l’impôt soit néfaste aux échanges commerciaux, par exemple si par ce 
moyen les importations d’électricité à base de combustibles fossiles ou 
d’énergie nucléaire soient empêchées ou évincées. 
La deuxième option dépend largement des modalités précises de l’impôt 
général sur le CO2 futur qui s’appliquerait à la fois sur l’électricité domes-
tique et importée. Si la production nationale d’électricité bénéficie 
d’exceptions privilégiées, il est peu probable, du point de vue du droit de 
l’OMC, qu’un tel impôt sur la teneur en CO2 de l’électricité importée 
puisse constituer une mesure d’ajustement fiscal à la frontière (MAFF) 
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compatible avec les règles de l’OMC. Afin de mettre en œuvre légalement 
une MAFF sur le contenu en carbone de l’électricité, une contribution sur 
le CO2 devrait être appliquée sans exceptions en Suisse aux centrales élec-
triques domestiques à combustibles fossiles. Les considérations mention-
nées ci-dessus s’appliquent également à une contribution sur le CO2. 
Impôts dans le cadre du droit de l’Union Européenne  
Du point de vue du droit de l’UE, un état membre peut prévoir un impôt 
interne, à condition que celui-ci n’entraîne pas une discrimination indi-
recte. Le taux d’imposition ne peut être inférieur au taux minimal prévu 
par la directive 2003/96/EC du Conseil du 27 octobre 2003, restructurant 
le cadre communautaire de taxation des produits énergétiques et de 
l’électricité. Selon le principe de l’imposition en aval, la contribution ne 
peut pas, en règle générale, être imposée à des produits énergétiques utili-
sés pour la production d’énergie. Nonobstant, les exploiteurs de centrales 
électriques sont obligées de participer au système d’échange de quotas 
d’émissions et l’alimentation en énergie ou peuvent encore être, dans le fu-
tur,  soumis à une contribution sur le CO2. Le droit actuel de l’Union n’a 
pas encore élucidé si ces principes s’appliquent également à l’électricité 
provenant d’énergie nucléaire. Enfin, une contribution n’est pas considérée 
comme un droit tarifaire (prohibé) ou une taxe ayant un effet équivalent 
aux droits de douane, simplement parce qu’elle touche à un certain type 
d’énergie qui n’est pas issu de la production intérieure. 
Impôts dans le cadre de l’accord de libre-échange Suisse-CEE 1972 
En principe, dans l’optique des relations bilatérales entre la Suisse et l’UE, 
l’introduction d’un impôt sur l’électricité est possible, mais dépend des 
modalités de son application. En effet, elle pourrait susciter des inquié-
tudes politiques et des problèmes au niveau de la mise en œuvre. Selon 
l’accord de libre-échange entre la Suisse et la CEE de 1972, un nouvel im-
pôt ne devrait pas entraîner des discriminations directes ou indirectes en-
vers les importations. Afin d’éviter des préoccupations politiques et de mi-
nimiser les risques de discriminations en matière d’imposition de 
l’électricité importée de l’UE, une contribution progressive tenant compte 
des ajustements réalisés par les producteurs d’électricité de l’UE pourrait 
être envisagée. Par contre, l’imposition différenciée suggérée comporte un 
certain risque d’être considérée comme une aide d’Etat, au sens de 
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l’accord de libre-échange de 1972. L’application d’exceptions implicites 
dépendrait des modalités et de la conception de l’impôt. 
Impôts sur les importations de l’énergie nucléaire  
L’introduction d’impôts sur les importations de l’énergie de provenance 
nucléaire dans le cadre d’un système d’imposition différentielle demande 
une solution qui appliquera les mêmes tariffs pour la production importée 
et la production de provenance suisse. Cela s’impose sur la base du droit 
de l’OMC tant que l’accord de libre-échange de 1972.  Il n’est pas possible 
d’imposer une taxe CO2 car l’cette énergie est neutre en ce qui concerne 
ce type d’émission. Dans un cadre restreint, les Etats Membres de l’UE 
peuvent justifier des taux augmentés sur la base des risques pour la santé 
publique.  
Imposition des Droits de Douanes  
Finalement, selon l’article XXVIII GATT, l’introduction des droits des 
douanes sur les importations pourrait être mise en œuvre uniquement par 
une déconsolidation des tarifs à taux zéros suisses pour l’électricité basées 
sur les méthodes de production et par une compensation en conséquence 
de la réduction d’accès au marché. Du point de vue du droit de l’UE ainsi 
que de l’accord de libre-échange de 1972, des droits de douanes sur les 
importations ou les exportations d’électricité sont interdites et ne sauraient 
être justifiées. Pour cette raison, de telles mesures sont susceptibles de 
créer des problèmes politiques avec l’UE en se basant sur le droit du 
GATT et de l’accord de libre échange qui et exigeront des renégociations 
avec l’UE au sujet de cette question. 
Défis pratiques liés à la détermination de méthodes de production  
Sur le plan de la mise en œuvre, les trois options sont soumises aux mêmes 
défis. La détermination de l’origine de l’électricité s’avère problématique 
puisque pour l’instant seule l’électricité issue de sources renouvelables est 
certifiée par une garantie d’origine (GO). Si l’importation d’électricité est 
liée de manière générale à des exigences de fournir une GO, le risque per-
siste que la problématique doive être réexaminée dans le contexte des 
règles concernant les barrières non tarifaires. Dans une perspective à long 
terme, le système de certification de la garantie d’origine d’électricité de-
vrait éventuellement être ajusté dans son ensemble. Les négociations ac-
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tuelles sur la question de relier les SCEQU suisses et européens pourraient 
servir d’occasion afin de mettre en place un système d’imposition 
d’électricité se basant une contribution cohérente sur le CO2 ou encore un 
système général d’imposition qui n’aurait pas d’effet discriminatoire pour 
les producteurs d’électricité étrangers. Le principe de la reconnaissance et 
de l’équivalence mutuelle en ce qui concerne les mesures de compensa-
tion, ou encore d’autres mesures pourraient également être réalisé dans les 
négociations actuelles sur l’accord sur l’électricité. 
 
 
2 Mandate and issues  
Energy supply in Switzerland is dependent to a large extent on energy 
from abroad – about 80% of the primary energy sources are imported. At 
the same time, the electricity sector can be characterized by an almost 
equal trade balance. In 2012 Switzerland imported around 87 TWh of elec-
tricity while it exported 89 TWh.1 Domestic gross electricity consumption 
in 2012 constituted around 63 TWh. Switzerland’s final energy consump-
tion has been steadily growing. In 2012 the final energy consumption grew 
by 3.7% compared to 2011,2 and in 2013 – by 0.6% compared to 2012.3 
Increasing demand for energy in Switzerland can be explained by chang-
ing weather conditions (colder winters and warmer summers), economic 
growth and an increasing population. However, higher levels of consump-
tion are also being accompanied by growing electricity production in Swit-
zerland. About 60% of the domestic electricity in 2012 was produced from 
renewable energy sources, mainly from hydropower. Electricity from so-
lar, biomass, biogas, wind and waste accounted for 3%. Currently there are 
only a few fossil fuel power plants generating electricity in Switzerland.4 
1  Botschaft zum ersten Massnahmenpaket der Energiestrategie 2050 (Revision des Energierechts) und zur Volksinitiative 
“Für den geordneten Ausstieg aus der Atomenergie (Atomausstiegsinitiative)”, 4 September 2013, BBl 2013 7561, 
7574-7575. 
2  Swiss Federal Office of Energy, Energy consumption up 3.7% in 2012, press release 27.06.2013, available at: 
http://www.bfe.admin.ch/energie/00588/00589/00644/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=49443 (last visited on 10.05.2014). 
3  Swiss Federal Office of Energy, Energy consumption up 0.6 percent in 2013, press release 10.04.2014, available at: 
http://www.bfe.admin.ch/energie/00588/00589/00644/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=52616 (last visited on 10.05.2014). 
4  Currently there are three combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) power plants in Switzerland: Monthey with 55 MW of 
total installed capacity (since 2009), Pierre-de-Plan with 34 MW of total installed capacity and Cornaux with 43 MW of 
total installed capacity. Some other small fossil fuel plants are mostly operated for transport sector needs. Thus current-
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The planned combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) power plants, including 
Cornaux II with 420 MW of total installed capacity, Utzenstorf with 400 
MW of total installed capacity, Perlen with 240 MW of total installed ca-
pacity and Vernier with 60 MW of total installed capacity, will have to 
comply with the new overall efficiency requirement and use the thermal 
heat and will also have to fully compensate their CO2 emissions.5 
Generation of electricity from Swiss nuclear power plants still plays a key 
role in the Swiss energy mix with the average share of 39% over the last 
ten years. After the Fukushima catastrophe most of the European countries 
reassessed their policies with respect to nuclear energy. Germany was 
quite radical and planned for a transition from nuclear energy by 2022, 
whereas France, which is the second largest producer of electricity from 
nuclear energy worldwide, planned only a small reduction of the share of 
nuclear energy. In Switzerland, the Federal Office of Environment 
(FOEN) decided in 2011 to reassess the existing energy strategy and the 
energy perspectives for 2035. On 25 May 2011 the Swiss Federal Council 
decided in favour of a gradual transition away from nuclear power. The 
existing nuclear power plants will operate only until the end of their secure 
operational life-span and will not be refurbished after that.6 In the long-
term this means that one third of Switzerland’s electricity supply will have 
to be produced from sources other than nuclear. In this respect the con-
struction of new gas-fired power plants may play a certain role for a secure 
energy supply.  
While Switzerland exports to large extent electricity produced from hy-
dropower plants, it imports almost the same amount of electricity produced 
at fossil fuel (coal) or nuclear power stations abroad (predominantly in 
France and Germany). This situation led to initiatives being brought to the 
Swiss Parliament envisaging a tax on electricity produced from fossil fuels 
abroad. For instance, a proposal has recently been submitted by Laurent 
ly production of electricitz from natural gas in Switzerland constitutes about 800 GWh annually. See: Verband Schwei-
zerischer Elektrizitätsunternehmen, Gaskombikraftwerk (GuD), Basiswissen-Dokument, Stand November 2012, 
available at: http://www.strom.ch/uploads/media/VSE_BWD_09_GuD_03-2013.pdf (last visited on 25.05.2014). 
5  See: Verband Schweizerischer Elektrizitätsunternehmen, Gaskombikraftwerk (GuD), Basiswissen-Dokument, Stand 
November 2012, available at: http://www.strom.ch/uploads/media/VSE_BWD_09_GuD_03-2013.pdf (last visited on 
25.05.2014). For detailed explanations of the requirements related to overall efficiency of fossil fuel power plants see 
Section 2.1 and the chart on p. 10. 
6  Energiestrategie 2050, p. 7588-7592. 
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Favre to the Swiss Parliament addressing the key question of accounting 
for the CO2 emissions with respect to the imported electricity produced 
from fossil fuels.7  
In the context of these recent developments and the existing Swiss legisla-
tion on taxes in the energy sector, we have been asked to evaluate the 
compatibility of imposing a CO2 levy on imported electricity from a WTO 
and EU law perspective, including the 1972 Free Trade Agreement be-
tween Switzerland and the EEC (Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA). 
This legal opinion is a follow-up to the legal opinion on differentiated tax-
ation of electricity submitted on 18.04.20148 (hereinafter referred to as 
Legal Opinion on Differentiated Electricity Taxation), where we presented 
an analysis of several options for a differentiated electricity tax, both for 
domestic and imported electricity and its compatibility with WTO law, EU 
law and Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA. 
 
3 Existing Swiss tax legislation in the field of minerals and 
CO2 emissions  
Swiss taxation in the energy sector is rooted to a large extent in Art. 131 of 
the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation.9 The provision stipu-
lates that the Confederation may levy special consumption taxes on vari-
ous energy sources, as well as a surcharge on motor fuels. This led to the 
adoption of the Mineral Oil Tax Act on 21 June 1996.10 The bill intro-
duced a petroleum tax and a surcharge on motor fuels. In parallel, Switzer-
land introduced incentive fees through the Environment Protection Act,11 
namely an incentive fee on sulphurous heating oil and an incentive fee on 
7  Favre Laurent, CO2 Abgabe auch auf importiertem Strom?, 14.3038 Postulat, 5.03.2014, available at: 
http://www.parlament.ch/d/suche/Seiten/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20143038 (last visited on 10.05.2014). 
8  Cottier at al., Differential Taxation of Electricity: Assessing the Compatibility with WTO Law, EU Law and the Swiss-
EEC Free Trade Agreement, WTI / Heuking Kühn Lüer Wojtek, available at: 
http://www.efv.admin.ch/e/downloads/finanzpolitik_grundlagen/els/Differentiatial%20_Taxation_e.pdf?lang=de&msg-
id=50122 (last visited on 10.05.2014). 
9  SR 101, Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999. 
10  SR 641.61, Mineralölsteuergesetz vom 21. Juni 1996 (Stand am 1. Januar 2012) (in this legal opinion referred to as 
MOTA). 
11  SR 814.01, Bundesgesetz über den Umweltschutz vom 7. Oktober 1983 (Stand am 1. November 2013). 
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sulphurous petrol and diesel oil.12 In light of the concerns regarding cli-
mate change and the obligations Switzerland undertook according to the 
Kyoto Protocol, an additional CO2 levy has been introduced and will be 
addressed in detail below. 
Fiscal measures also play an important role in the future Swiss energy pol-
icy. The Swiss Energy Strategy 2050 set the short-term (till 2020), medi-
um term (till 2035) and long-term (till 2050) goals for the Swiss energy 
sector. The strategy is based on four main pillars: fiscal measures (namely, 
the increase of the CO2 levy rate on heating fuels and adjustment of the 
feed-in tariff for renewables), increasing production of electricity from re-
newable energy sources, decreasing energy consumption (e.g. energy effi-
cient construction) and upgrading energy sector infrastructure (also in light 
of enhanced energy trade with neighbouring countries). 
3.1 The Swiss policy for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions  
In pursuit of the emissions reduction target of 8% undertaken under the 
Kyoto Protocol, at the end of the 1990s Switzerland adopted climate 
change related legislation. They key element of this legislative package 
was the CO2 Act, which came into force in 2000 and set emission reduc-
tion targets for 2008–2012. The revised CO2 Act entered into force in 
201313 and set reduction targets up to 2020.14 According to Art. 3 of the 
CO2 Act the target is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Switzerland 
by 20% by 2020 in comparison to the base year 1990. 
The CO2 Act of 2013 established an enhanced system of measures aiming 
at reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The CO2 Act differentiates be-
tween industries based on their energy intensity and imposes on them a 
number of respective obligations. The Act foresees a combination of 
measures: a CO2 levy, emission reduction certificates, and a system of 
compensation for CO2 emissions. Furthermore it sets a foundation for the 
12  Rolf Weber, Energy Law in Switzerland, Wolters Kluwer/Stämpfli Publishers (2012), at 662-663. 
13  SR 641.71, Bundesgesetz über die Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen (CO2-Gesetz) vom 23. Dezember 2011, Stand am 
1. Januar 2013. 
14  Thomas Cottier et al., Die Reschtsbeziehungen der Schweiz und der Europäischen Union, Stämpfli Verlag, 2014, at 
379. 
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Swiss emission-trading scheme (ETS). The provisions of the CO2 Act are 
detailed in the Ordinance on the Reduction of CO2 Emissions (CO2 Ordi-
nance).15  
Currently, the Swiss ETS is mandatory only for large CO2 emitters (e.g. 
paper industry) and also applies to mid-scale fossil fuel power plants with 
at least 20 MW and up to 100 MW of total installed capacity.16 For other 
enterprises of specific industries listed in Annex 7 to the CO2 Act, partici-
pation in the Swiss ETS is voluntary and based upon contractual arrange-
ments. 17 The FOEN sets the quantity of available emission allowances 
based on a cap, which is lowered every year. The emission allowances can 
be issued for free only in quantities that are required for CO2-efficient op-
erations to those companies, which participate in the ETS. Other emissions 
allowances are auctioned via the national Emissions Trading Registry.18 
The ETS in Switzerland is similar to the EU ETS, but not yet linked to the 
latter. The Federal Department of the Environment, Energy, Transport and 
Communication has been negotiating with the EU since 2009 with a view 
to linking the two systems. The latest (fifth) round of negotiations was 
completed in December 2013 and resulted in the fine-tuning of a draft 
agreement.19 
3.2 The Swiss CO2 levy system 
A CO2 levy is the main instrument for attaining the greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission reduction targets in Switzerland.20 As mentioned above the CO2 
levy was introduced by the CO2 Act. The provisions of the latter are de-
tailed in the CO2 Ordinance. The tax is levied on the production, extraction 
15  SR 641.711, Verordnung über die Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen (CO2-Verordnung) vom 30 November 2012. 
16  Annex 6 to the CO2 Ordinance. The requirements for fossil fuel power plants are detailed in Art. 22-25 of the CO2 Act 
and Art. 80-83 of the CO2 Ordinance. 
17  See Annex 7 to the CO2 Ordinance for an exhaustive list of activities, that give right to participate in the ETS or to an 
exemption from a CO2 tax based on their emission reduction obligations. 
18  FOEN; Topic Emissions trading. Swiss emissions trading scheme, available at: 
http://www.bafu.admin.ch/emissionshandel/05545/?lang=en (last visited on 10.07.2014). 
19  Fifth Round of Swiss-EU Negotiations on Linking their Emissions Trading Systems, FOEN News Release, 12.12.2013, 
available at: http://www.bafu.admin.ch/dokumentation/medieninformation/00962/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=51350 
(last visited on 10.05.2014). 
20  FOEN, Topic CO2 levy, available at: http://www.bafu.admin.ch/co2-abgabe/index.html?lang=en (last visited on 
10.05.2014). 
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and import of fossil fuels [Art. 29 (1) CO2 Act]. The CO2 levy was intro-
duced in 2008 and set at 12 Swiss francs per tonne of CO2. The revised 
CO2 Act, which entered into force in 2013, also prescribes the minimum 
rate of the CO2 levy, namely 36 Swiss francs per tonne of CO2, which can 
be than increased by the Federal Council up to 120 Swiss francs, if the in-
termediate goals are not achieved. As of 1 January 2014 the CO2 levy was 
increased to 60 Swiss francs, since the objectives set out in Art. 94 of the 
CO2 ordinance had not been met.21 
The CO2 levy applies to coal, as well as other heating fuels, that are sub-
ject to mineral oil tax according to the Mineral Oil Tax Act (MOTA),22 
namely crude oil, natural gas etc. The CO2 levy does not apply to motor 
fuels (diesel or gasoline). However, since January 2014 any person who 
releases into circulation motor fuels for consumption is obliged to com-
pensate for part of the emissions that are attributable to the use of the mo-
tor fuels as an energy source.23 Exemptions from the compensation obliga-
tion related to motor fuels are possible for de minimis imports.24 Also fuels 
that are exempted from mineral oil tax according to Art. 17 MOTA are re-
spectively exempted from the compensation obligation (e.g. for regular 
airline services).25 
Importantly, according to Art. 25 of the CO2 Act, fossil fuel power plants 
are exempted from a CO2 levy through a reimbursement procedure, but 
they must comply with the compensation obligation as described below.  
According to Art. 22 of the CO2 Act all operators of fossil fuel power 
plants are obliged to compensate for the amount of their CO2 emissions 
and to operate their plants according to up-to-date technological require-
ments. A new fossil fuel power plant can receive an operation permit if it 
has an overall efficiency of 62%, which is only possible if some of the heat 
produced in the combustion process is also utilized. The only exception 
where a lower rate of overall efficiency is permitted (58.5%) applies to 
21  BAFU, Erhebung der CO2-Abgabe auf Brennstoffen, available at: http://www.bafu.admin.ch/co2-
abgabe/12357/index.html?lang=de (last visited on 10.05.2014). 
22  See Art. 2(1) MOTA. 
23  Art. 26(1) CO2 Act. 
24  Art. 26(4) CO2 Act. 
25  Art. 86(2) CO2 Ordinance. 
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fossil fuel power plants operated in places where fossil fuel power plants 
already existed (e.g. in the case of Chavalon).26 
For the purposes of the CO2 Act the fossil-fuel power plants can be subdi-
vided into two groups: those that mainly produce electricity and those that 
mainly produce thermal heat (combined heat and power (CHP) plants).  
• CHP plants produce mainly thermal heat if their overall efficiency is at 
least 80%.27 They only have a compensation obligation if their total capac-
ity exceeds 100 MW. 
• CHP plants with a total capacity below 100 MW have to pay a CO2 levy 
on the fossil fuels they use unless they participate in the Swiss ETS under 
Articles 15 or 16 of the CO2 Act or undertake an emission reduction obli-
gation and provide an annual report on progress according to Art. 31(1)(b) 
of the CO2 Act.28 CHP plants with a total capacity below 100 MW and 
with an overall efficiency of less than 80% are considered to mainly pro-
duce electricity and fall under the scope of the compensation obligation.  
There are also a number of fossil fuel power plants that are exempted from 
the compensation obligation, e.g. those with a total capacity of less than 1 
MW or temporary fossil fuel power plants that are operated for less than 2 
years (e.g. for construction purposes).29 
Thus, a compensation obligation exists as an alternative to the CO2 levy. 
Fossil fuel power plants with a total installed capacity of more than 100 
MW will fall under the scope of compensation provisions, and only CHP 
plants mainly producing heat (heat-CHP) with a total capacity below 100 
MW but at least 20 MW must participate in the ETS scheme in accordance 
with Annex 6 of the CO2 Ordinance. Pursuant to Annex 9 of the CO2 Or-
dinance, no free emission certificates are granted for the generation of 
electricity. Otherwise such heat-CHP power plants can qualify under An-
nex 7 for voluntary participation in the ETS30 or undertake a voluntary 
26  Art. 81 of the CO2 Ordinance. 
27  Art. 80 of the CO2 Ordinance. 
28  BAFU, Verordnung über die Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen: Erläuternder Bericht, 30.11.2012, at 36. 
29  Art. 82 of the CO2 Ordinance. 
30  See also Art. 41 of the CO2 Ordinance. 
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emission reduction obligation under Art. 66 of the CO2 Ordinance. Other-
wise, such heat-CHP power plants will be subject to the CO2 levy. Alt-
hough all of the compensation measures have a financial element, as they 
require a considerable investment in the emission reduction projects, only 
a small number of fossil fuel power plants would actually pay a CO2 levy. 
The flow chart below illustrates the application of the CO2 levy to fossil 
fuel power plants. 
The compensation measures for the fossil fuel power plants include: 
(i) emission reduction projects in Switzerland, which fulfil all the criteria 
as fixed by Art. 5 of the CO2 ordinance, namely the criteria of additionali-
ty;31  
(ii) investment in production of electricity or heat from renewable energy 
sources;  
(iii) replacing existing fossil heat sources with heat produced by the power 
plant and directly extracted;  
(iv) confirmation of the emission reductions in Switzerland, and  
(v) provision of emission reduction certificates.32  
31  Art. 83 of the CO2 Ordinance. See also BAFU, Projekte zur Emissionsverminderung im Inland. Ein Modul der Mittei-
lung des BAFU als Vollzugsbehörde zur CO2-Verordnung, 2013, available at: 
http://www.bafu.admin.ch/publikationen/publikation/01724/index.html?lang=de (last visited on 25.05.2014). 
32  Emission reduction certificates can be accepted only for compensation of up to 50% of the CO2 emissions according to 
Art. 22 (2) CO2 Act. 
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This scheme has been translated from: BAFU, Faktenblatt: Entscheidungsdiagramm zu rechtlicher 
Grundlage für fossil-thermische Kraftwerke und Wärme-Köpplungs-Anlagen, available at: 
http://www.bafu.admin.ch/klima/12325/12349/12351/index.html?lang=de (last visited on 10.05.2014). 
 
 
 
The exact compensation measure has to be agreed between the government 
and the power plant operator in a compensation agreement.33 Under certain 
conditions emission reduction projects abroad can also be taken into ac-
count up to 50% of the emissions produced.34 Namely, Switzerland ac-
33  Art. 84 of the CO2 Ordinance. 
34  Art. 4 of the CO2 Ordinance. 
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cepts only internationally recognized emission reduction certificates, i.e. 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from the Clean Development 
Mechanism projects (CDM) under Art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol and 
Emission Reduction Units (ERU) from the Joint Implementation Projects 
under Art. 6 of the Kyoto Protocol.35 Emission reduction certificates for 
projects abroad based on a voluntary market are not accepted for the pur-
poses of compensation.36 Moreover, it is required to show that the reduc-
tion of emissions was additional, meaning that it would not have been pos-
sible without participation of Switzerland in the project. Finally, emission 
reduction certificates are to be accepted only in the case that they are not 
excluded under Annex 2 of the CO2 Ordinance (e.g. certificates for the op-
eration of hydro power plants with total installed capacity of more than 20 
MW, certificates from projects not in least-developed countries (LDCs), 
emission reduction certificates that were received from projects whose op-
eration was in violation of human rights). 
The CO2 levy is reimbursed to fossil fuel power plants that are subject to a 
compensation obligation.37 The same is true for those fossil fuel plants that 
undertake voluntary emission reduction obligations38 or participate in 
ETS.39 However, if the fossil fuel power plants do not comply with either 
of these obligations they have to face sanctions. Where there is a breach of 
a compensation obligation, the contractual penalty will be levied by the 
Federation and will be calculated based on the estimated costs of emission 
reduction services that have not been provided.40 In the case that some of 
the CO2 emissions are not covered by the emission rights and emission re-
duction certificates, a fossil fuel power plant has to pay 120 Swiss francs 
per tonne of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent (CO2eq).41 The same penalty ap-
35  ERUs result from Join Implementation projects that can be carried out jointly by two industrialized countries. CERs 
result from CDM projects in developing countries that are carried out by an industrialized country listed in Annex I of 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
36  FOEN, Fact Sheet: Emission Reductions Achieved Abroad: Quality, Quantity and Carry-Over, 28 May 2013, available 
at: http://www.bafu.admin.ch/emissionshandel/05545/12456/index.html?lang=en (last visited on 25.05.2014). 
37  Art. 25 CO2 Act. 
38  Art. 31(1)(b) CO2 Act, Art. 96(2)(c). 
39  Art. 17 CO2 Act. 
40  Art. 24 CO2 Act. 
41  CO2eq. or Carbon Dioxide Equivalent (CDE) is based on the so-called global warming potential (GWP) of a green-
house gas. The GWP of a gas is the warming caused over a 100-year period by the emission of one ton of the gas rela-
tive to the warming caused over the same period by the emission of one ton of CO2. 
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plies if a fossil fuel power plant does not comply with its voluntary emis-
sion reduction obligations.42 
3.3 Fuel taxes in Switzerland 
The Petroleum Tax Act or the Mineral Oil Tax Act (MOTA), as it is also 
referred to in English, was enacted based on Art. 131 of the Federal Con-
stitution of the Swiss Confederation. It introduced a petroleum tax on 
crude oil, other mineral fuels, natural gas and products obtained through 
their refinement and motor fuels, as well as a surcharge on motor fuels.43 
According to Art. 3 of the MOTA not only manufacturing and production 
of the mentioned goods, but also their imports are subject to the tax. The 
petroleum tax varies considerably depending on the type of product and its 
use. A number of goods are exempted, e.g. fuels that are used by aircraft 
for their regular services. The revenues from petroleum tax are mainly di-
rected to road traffic projects.44  
The MOTA was amended in 2008 to take into consideration the changes in 
the fuel market. Only locally produced biofuels are exempted (partially or 
fully) from the mineral oil tax if they comply with a number of criteria.45 
Both domestic and foreign biofuels have to comply with the environmental 
and social requirements.46 In light of these requirements and the domestic 
production of biofuels, the Swiss Federal Council determines the quantities 
of biofuels that can be imported tax-free. 
For the purposes of the legal analysis below this act plays an important 
role inasmuch the CO2 Act applies to fossil fuels covered by MOTA.47  
42  Art. 76 CO2 Ordinance. 
43  Art. 1 of the MOTA. 
44  Weber, at 206-207. 
45  Art. 12b of the MOTA. 
46  Art. 12b(3)(b) of the MOTA. 
47  Art. 93 CO2 Ordinance. 
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3.4 Future energy taxation in Switzerland according to the Energy Strat-
egy 2050 
According to the Energy Strategy 2050 a considerable reform of fiscal 
measures should be carried out mid-term, i.e. by 2021. In the initial phase 
of this reform, profits from this new energy tax can be used for support 
measures. However, the link to financial support measures should be grad-
ually eradicated. In the case of electricity, the Swiss Energy Strategy sug-
gests that the tax could be based on the amount of electricity consumed 
(CHF per kW/h).48 Some of the possible options for the implementation of 
the energy tax on electricity were addressed in our previous legal opinion49 
and thus will not be repeated in this follow-up study. 
 
4 Application of CO2 levies and tariffs to imported electricity 
under the WTO law, EU law and the FTA Switzerland–
EEC 
4.1 Assessment under WTO rules 
We have been asked to assess whether Switzerland could successfully 
make the case for taxing imported electricity produced from fossil fuels 
(for the purposes of this study, “grey” electricity) under WTO law. The ra-
tionale for such a measure rests on the need to accelerate the transition to-
wards the decarbonisation of the Swiss power system, which in particular 
implies best use and recourse to existing hydropower in Switzerland. Since 
at present Switzerland produces only a negligible amount of electricity 
from fossil fuels,50 any fiscal measure uniquely addressing ‘grey’ forms of 
electricity risks being treated as if it exclusively targets imports. This could 
give rise to additional complications under WTO law.  
Under the present circumstances, the following design options could be 
considered: 
48  Botschaft zum ersten Massnahmenpaket der Energiestrategie 2050 (Revision des Energierechts) und zur Volksinitiative 
“Für den geordneten Ausstieg aus der Atomenergie (Atomausstiegsinitiative)”, 4 September 2013, BBl 2013 7561, 
7599-7600. 
49  See fn. 8 above. 
50  The situation may change in the future, should a gas combustion plant be constructed on the Chavalon site in Western 
Switzerland. 
29 
 
                                                 
1. Fossil-fuel-generated forms of electricity are subject to a higher tax within 
the framework of a comprehensive scheme of electricity tax differentia-
tion, to be framed along the lines of Options A and B discussed in our pre-
vious Legal Opinion.51 In other words, it would be an electricity tax differ-
entiated according to the source of the electricity. Although such schemes 
have been assessed as generally compatible with WTO law, two additional 
points need to be discussed when shifting the focus of an electricity tax 
scheme from “exempting renewables” to “taxing fossil fuels”: 
• Options A and B were analysed in the context of their implementation by 
means of GOs. In EU Member States, however, GOs are issued only for 
renewable forms of energy. Therefore, while GOs could be used in the 
scheme to exempt both domestic and imported green electricity, the same 
is not true when the tax differentiates between different forms of non-
renewable electricity. 
• EU producers of grey electricity importing it into Switzerland already 
compensate for the environmental externalities associated with the burning 
of fossil fuels through EU ETS. It remains to be seen whether the price 
paid for emission allowances under such a scheme could be considered 
comparable to the proposed Swiss tax on grey electricity. 
2. A tax on electricity produced from fossil fuels could also be based on the 
CO2 content of electricity. This would raise a different set of issues. Such a 
‘carbon’ tax on electricity could be framed within an overall carbon taxa-
tion scheme in Switzerland. With respect to this option, specific problems 
to be addressed include: 
• The relation of this tax to the CO2 levy scheme currently in place in Swit-
zerland; 
• The implementation problem associated with the EU GO system not ac-
counting for non-renewable sources of electricity and the EU and Swiss 
GO system not certifying the CO2 content of electricity generation; 
• The consideration of emissions costs paid by importers of fossil fuel elec-
tricity under the EU ETS.  
3. A charge on fossil-fuel-generated electricity would be imposed in Switzer-
land as a tariff (an import duty). In this case a tariff on renewable electrici-
ty would be kept at the current zero rate of a bound tariff and a tariff on 
51  See fn. 8 above. 
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non-renewable electricity would be set above zero. To implement this op-
tion, the bound tariff on electricity in Switzerland’s GATT schedule of 
concessions would need to be deconsolidated according to the procedure 
foreseen in GATT Art. XXVIII. It would be subject to negotiated compen-
sation of interested parties. In addition, this option requires consideration 
of the following issues: 
• The relationship of an electricity tariff to the current CO2 levy scheme and 
to the proposed differentiated electricity tax scheme in Switzerland (as dis-
cussed in Legal Opinion on Differentiated Electricity Taxation52) 
• The implementation hurdles of tracing the source of electricity and the 
CO2 content of electricity generation through the current EU GO system. 
4.1.1 Tax on the source of electricity 
a) Taxing fossil fuel electricity in the absence of domestic production of 
electricity from fossil fuels 
An electricity tax on fossil fuel electricity can either be imposed as part of 
a differentiated electricity tax system in Switzerland, which was analysed 
in the Legal Opinion on Differentiated Electricity Taxation,53 or as a sepa-
rate measure. In our previous legal opinion,54 we described the three pos-
sible outcomes of the likeness analysis under the non-discrimination test of 
GATT Art. III:2.  
If fossil fuel electricity is found to be a like product (1st scenario) or a 
product which is directly competitive or substitutable (2nd scenario) in rela-
tion to nuclear or renewable electricity, the application of a tax on fossil 
fuel electricity can be justified under the environmental exceptions of 
GATT Art. XX. 
If fossil fuel electricity is found to be a product which is not like to elec-
tricity generated from other sources (e.g. nuclear or solar) (3rd scenario), 
one needs to give particular consideration to the fact that only a small 
52  See fn. 8 above. 
53  See fn. 8 above. 
54  See fn. 8 above. 
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amount of electricity is currently produced from fossil fuels in Switzer-
land.55 This would mean that the tax predominantly affects imported elec-
tricity. Here the relevant question is whether WTO law allows the applica-
tion of taxes on importation with respect to products that are not domesti-
cally produced by the importing country. The main rule of the WTO 
Agreement that regulates the application of taxes to imported products is 
found in GATT Art. III:2. This rule sets forth the national treatment (NT) 
principle in taxation, according to which taxes on imported products that 
are like domestic products should not be imposed in excess of taxes im-
posed on domestic products; and taxes on imported products that are di-
rectly competitive or substitutable for domestic products should not be im-
posed so that they afford protection to domestic production.  
In other words, the core idea of the NT rule for the application of taxes on 
imports, as explained in GATT Art. III, is that imported products are not 
discriminated against in favour of domestic products, or, in general terms, 
domestic production should not be protected from imports. In the situation 
where domestic production of like products is absent, the object of poten-
tial protection is also absent, and therefore there is no possibility for dis-
crimination against imported products. In this situation, a tax on imported 
products can still be imposed as an internal tax. There is nothing in the text 
of GATT Art. III:2 to suggest otherwise. This was also the conclusion of 
the 1970 Working Party on BTAs. It noted that GATT Art. III ‘could not 
be interpreted as forbidding the application of taxes to products not domes-
tically produced…’.56 
In fact, it is not uncommon for excise taxes, value-added-taxes or other in-
direct taxes to be imposed on imported products in the absence of domestic 
like products.57 Examples include specific excise taxes on tea, coffee and 
chocolate imposed by developed countries on importation of these prod-
ucts from tropical developing countries. Likewise, VATs are imposed on 
all imported products irrespective of whether like products are produced 
domestically or not. A differentiated tax on electricity (also if linked to the 
55  The situation can however change in the future with the planned reconstruction of a natural gas power plant in 
Chavalon. 
56  GATT, Report by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464, 2 December 1970, BISD 18S/97, para. 32. 
57  K. Holzer, Carbon-related Border Adjustment and WTO Law (Edward Elgar, 2014), pp. 74-75. 
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CO2 content as discussed below) has all the characteristics of an excise 
tax: it is a tax eventually paid by consumers on the purchase or consump-
tion of the product (electricity). 
In the absence of like domestic production, a tax which would be imposed 
on imported fossil fuel electricity would still fall under GATT Art. III:2 as 
an internal tax and not under GATT Art. II:1(b) as an import duty (tariff) 
under conditions discussed below. The Appellate Body (AB) in India – 
Additional Import Duties found that ‘if a charge satisfies the conditions of 
Art. II:2(a), it would not result in a violation of Art. II:1(b)’.58 It should be 
noted that GATT Art. II:2(a) refers to GATT Art. III:2 and allows, in addi-
tion to an import duty, the imposition of a non-discriminatory domestic tax 
on imported products consistent with GATT Art. III:2, i.e. in a non-
discriminatory manner. 
However, the current situation in Switzerland is not characterised by the 
complete absence of domestic production of fossil fuel electricity. In order 
to qualify as a tax rather than a tariff, the emolument must also apply to 
domestically produced electricity from fossil fuels, including the electrici-
ty which may in future be produced in new fossil fuel power plants, such 
as the one planned on the Chavalon site. The India – Additional Import 
Duties dispute provides a good illustration in this regard. In that dispute, 
the panel and the AB had to distinguish between border tax adjustments 
compliant with GATT Articles II:2(a) and III:2 and import duties in excess 
of bound tariffs in violation of GATT Art. II:1(b).59 The US, as a com-
plainant, insisted that additional and extra-additional import duties im-
posed by India fell under Art. II:1 and were in violation of this provision 
since they were in excess of bound tariffs. In response, India argued that 
these fiscal measures fell under GATT Articles II:2(a) and III:2 because 
they were ‘levied in lieu of state excise duties imposed in respect of like 
alcoholic beverages produced or manufactured in the state imposing the 
duty’, and also ‘to counterbalance sales taxes, VAT and other local taxes 
58  India – Additional Import Duties, AB Report, para 153. 
59  The subject of the dispute was the additional duties imposed by India on imports of alcoholic beverages and extra-
additional duties imposed by India on imports of alcoholic beverages and some agricultural and industrial products, in-
cluding milk, raisins, orange juice and calculating and processing machines. 
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and charges’.60 The main question that the panel and the AB asked when 
deciding whether the measures could qualify as internal taxes was whether 
they were also applied to existing like domestic products. Since the 
measures were not imposed on the existing like domestic products, the 
panel and the AB could not put them in the category of BTAs imposed on 
imported products in addition to import duties. Instead, they considered 
them to be import duties that were imposed on imported products in excess 
of bound tariffs and thus in violation of GATT Art. II:1 (b). 
In conclusion, in the absence of domestic production, the imposition of a 
tax on fossil fuel electricity leading to the situation where the tax burden 
would fall entirely on imported fossil fuel electricity is in principle ac-
ceptable under WTO rules so long as this means that there would be no 
like domestic electricity generated from fossil fuels receiving a more fa-
vourable treatment.61 Yet, considering that at present Switzerland does 
generate some fossil fuel electricity and that it plans to expand this produc-
tion in the future, the imposition of a tax only on imported fossil fuel elec-
tricity runs the risk of violating the national treatment rule, while also be-
ing difficult to defend under Art. XX GATT.  
b) Implementation hurdles associated with the use of GOs 
The imposition of a tax on imported electricity generated from fossil fuels 
faces the problem of tracing the source of electricity which cannot be re-
solved through the use of the GO system currently in place in the EU. 
While the Swiss GO system accounts for different sources of electricity, 
including fossil fuel sources, GOs are usually used in EU member states to 
trace only renewable sources of electricity. Hence, to tax imported fossil 
fuel electricity would require the upgrading of the current EU GO system 
to include information on all sources of electricity. If this were done, it 
60  India-Additional Import Duties, AB Report, para 4. 
61  It is important to note that this conclusion is only valid under the third scenario of the like products analysis of grey 
and green electricity, i.e. where grey and green electricity are found to be unlike products. Under the first and second 
scenarios of the assessment of likeness, where grey and green electricity qualify as like products or products directly 
competitive or substitutable, an application of a tax only to imported fossil fuel electricity would result in a violation of 
the NT rule, as the taxed imported grey electricity would be treated less favourably than the not-taxed like or directly 
competitive green domestic electricity. Under these scenarios, a tax on fossil fuel electricity would need to be justified 
under the environmental exceptions of GATT Art. XX, along the lines of argument described in Legal Opinion on Dif-
ferentiated Electricity Taxation. 
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would also be possible to further differentiate a tax treatment to include 
electricity generated from nuclear sources.  
c) Accounting for the emissions costs paid by producers of imported fos-
sil fuel-generated electricity under EU ETS  
A further question relates to the fact that – to the extent that the grey elec-
tricity imported by Switzerland comes from EU Member States – EU pow-
er generators are under the obligation to comply with the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS).62 This means that the EU producers of fossil-
fuel-generated electricity are domestically required to buy and surrender 
annually emissions allowances up to the amount necessary to cover the 
number of tonnes of carbon emitted in each previous year. In other words, 
they are already subject to a financial burden whose aim coincides with the 
rationale for imposing the tax on grey electricity imported to Switzerland, 
i.e. to internalize the negative environmental externalities associated with 
burning fossil fuels in the course of electricity generation and thus to dis-
incentivise fossil-fuel-generated forms of electricity production. The ques-
tion then arises whether grey electricity coming into Switzerland from EU 
power generators participating in the EU ETS could still be legitimately 
subjected to a Swiss tax on fossil-fuel-generated electricity or whether 
such a tax would have to be somehow readjusted (i.e. reduced or even ex-
empted) in order to take into account the EU ETS costs component already 
borne by EU electricity producers.  
There is no precedent in WTO law to suggest that a state may have to take 
into account the effects of a foreign ETS when imposing a tax on the im-
port of electricity. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that, even under EU 
law, electricity producers are not exempt from taxation simply because 
they bear the costs of ETS allowances.  
An assessment under WTO law primarily depends on whether the imposi-
tion of a full tax on grey electricity covered by the EU ETS could be 
claimed to reveal a protectionist intent (i.e. in the absence of fossil fuel 
electricity production in Switzerland, the mere discouragement of cheap 
62  For an overall overview of the EU cap-and-trade scheme, see: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm (last 
visited on 25.05.2014). 
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imports of grey electricity could look like surreptitious support for more 
expensive forms of green electricity produced domestically). This could 
impair justification under Art. XX GATT, as arbitrary discrimination can-
not be justified under the chapeau. 63  When considering this possibility, 
however, two elements should be kept in mind. First, the CO2 allowances 
bought by operators of electricity installations covered by the EU ETS im-
pose a certain price per tonne of CO2 emissions. Accordingly, to the extent 
that the tax imposed on fossil fuel-generated electricity in Switzerland 
would not be per se designed as a carbon tax but as an electricity tax ex-
pressed in terms of a certain amount per kWh, the equivalence between the 
two types of measures would not be immediate. The only way for the two 
measures to become comparable would be to determine and attribute a cer-
tain amount of CO2 emissions per kWh of electricity.64 However, depend-
ing on the technology used, varying amounts of CO2 emissions would be 
released into the atmosphere by different power stations, and differences 
would also occur within different installations using the same fossil fuel.65 
Although, as from 2013, power stations must buy all their allowances in 
order to cover each tonne of CO2 emitted in the previous year, quite often 
the installations covered by the EU ETS, and especially the power stations, 
have benefited from free allowances granted by the governments during 
the previous phases of the EU ETS and have thus accumulated a vast re-
serve of surplus allowances.66 This circumstance has determined, on the 
63  For the requirements of chapeau of Art. XX GATT see Legal Opinion on Differentiated Electricity Taxation, fn.8 
above. 
64  It should be noted that estimates of CO2 emissions from fuel combustion have been calculated by the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) using the IEA energy balances and the default methods and emission factors from the Revised 
1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories. States are also required to submit this estimates to the 
UNFCCC based on the same guidelines. However, not only IEA estimated and national estimates do often differ, but 
they are average estimates of the CO2 emissions per each fuel combustion per country. IEA (2012), CO2 Emissions 
from Fuel Combustion. Viewed at: http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/co2highlights.pdf (Accessed 15 June 2014). For 
the implications of setting a flat rate of CO2 emissions/kWh of each type of fossil fuel-generated electricity see foot-
note 65.  
65  Hence, the Swiss authorities would have two different options: (i) they could set a flat rate of CO2 emissions/kWh of 
each type of fossil fuel-generated electricity based on different guiding criteria (i.e. one for gas-generated electricity, 
one for coal-generated electricity, etc.); (ii) they could differentiate such rate on a case-by-case basis. In the former 
case, on the one hand, there could be problems of discrimination as the flat rate could put the installations running un-
der the best available technology at a disadvantage; on the other hand, the choice of best available technology criterion 
would risk not to ensure the level of environmental protection which Switzerland aims to achieve by placing its own 
level of internal taxation. The latter solution would be realistically difficult to administer and not immune from WTO-
compatibility problems. (See fn. Error! Bookmark not defined. below). 
66  K. Neuhoff et al., Baking of Surplus Emissions Allowances, German Institute for Economic Research, 2012, available 
at http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.394484.de/dp1196.pdf (last visited on 25.05.2014).  
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one hand, the shrinkage of CO2 allowances in the EU market67 and, on the 
other hand, increased the flexibility of power generators to resort to their 
own reserve to cover the need for extra allowances instead of buying them 
on the market.68 Hence, it would be even harder to determine what exactly 
was the price imposed on imported grey electricity as a result of its inclu-
sion in the EU ETS for the purposes of assessing whether it has already 
been “taxed” sufficiently (i.e. at a rate which corresponds to the level of 
environmental protection sought by Switzerland) before entering Switzer-
land.  
For these reasons, even if the CO2 price paid by EU operators of power 
stations under the ETS could be somehow converted into a comparable 
“kWh tax unit”, too many variables seem to prevent such an exercise from 
ultimately providing an accurate and reliable estimate of the price per kWh 
borne by grey electricity imported into Switzerland as a result of its inclu-
sion in the EU ETS.69 It is therefore unlikely that the taxation of imported 
grey electricity could be successfully contested before the WTO dispute 
settlement bodies on the basis that EU generators of grey electricity al-
ready pay a price as a result of their inclusion in the EU ETS. Apart from 
the burdensome technicalities inherent in constructing a methodology 
aimed at determining the EU ETS price component to be taken into ac-
count for the purposes of re-modulating the Swiss level of taxation on im-
ported grey electricity, there is a strong chance that it would result in an 
overestimation of the CO2 price borne by EU grey electricity generators in 
the EU ETS, thus limiting the environmental benefit which constitutes the 
very rationale upon which such taxation is based. 
67   Ibid. 
68  Ibid.  
69  To solve this problem, the producer/supplier could be left free to demonstrate on a case-by-case basis whether he would 
be entitled to a tax reduction for the grey electricity imported into Switzerland based on the proved cost incurred to for 
the production of that volume of electricity as a result of the inclusion in the ETS. However, even in that case, addition-
al WTO compatibility issues would arise out of the additional burden on Swiss suppliers for the part of grey electricity 
imported from abroad. As mentioned in our previous legal opinion, given the broad interpretation of the term “re-
striction” on the importation embraced by the WTO dispute settlement bodies, nothing excludes that, based on the in-
herent difficulties in proving the price paid per kWh by grey electricity producers importing into Switzerland as a result 
of the inclusion into the EU ETS, such requirement could be considered to run afoul of Art. XI:1 GATT. See fn. 8 
above, Legal Opinion of Differentiated Electricity Differentiation, section 4.1.4 b) for a discussion of the case-law on 
Art. XI:1 GATT and also section 4.2.4c) for an application of the case-law.  
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Finally, it is also worth noting that a vast body of literature has analysed 
the extent to which the economic burden imposed on installations covered 
by the EU ETS (i.e. the price of CO2 allowances bought on the market) 
could be considered a “tax” for the purposes of WTO law. No clear an-
swer, however, has been reached.70 Hence, there is even a possibility that 
the comparability between the two instruments for the sake of elaborating 
guiding criteria to fully or partially exempt EU power generators from a 
Swiss tax on grey electricity would not even be found to be possible.71 
In conclusion, if Switzerland imposes a tax within the context of a general 
scheme of differentiated electricity taxation, the chances are slim that it 
could be challenged based on the fact that the EU ETS already imposes a 
CO2 price on covered installations. In the case that such tax is construed as 
a CO2 levy, this aspect would have different implications (see section 3.1.2 
below). 
4.1.2 Tax on the CO2 content of electricity 
As was discussed in the Legal Opinion on BTAs (Ecoplan 2013),72 a car-
bon tax on electricity, if introduced in Switzerland, could be extended to 
imported electricity as a border tax adjustment (BTA) measure within the 
meaning of GATT Articles II:2(a), III:2 and Ad Art. III. Possible viola-
tions of non-discrimination rules resulting from the PPM nature of the tax 
(the fact that it is levied on emissions that occurred during the production 
process) could in principle be justified under the environmental exceptions 
70  J De Cendra, ‘Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An Analysis vis-à-vis 
WTO Law’ (2006) 15(2) RECIEL 131, p. 136; J Pauwelyn, ‘U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Con-
cerns: the Limits and Options of International Trade Law’ (2007) Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions 
Working Paper, pp. 21-22 ; R Ismer and K Neuhoff, ‘International Cooperation to Limit the Use of Border Adjustment’ 
Workshop summary (Workshop convened by Climate Strategies, South Center, Geneva, 10 September 2008), p. 9; C 
McLure, ‘The GATT-Legality of Border Adjustments for Carbon Taxes and the Cost of Emissions Permits: a Riddle, 
Wrapped in a Mystery, Inside an Enigma’ (2011) 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 221 286; R Ismer, ‘Mitigating Climate Change 
Through Price Instruments: An Overview of the Legal Issues in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices’ in C Herrmann and 
J Terhechte (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic Law (Berlin: Springer-Verlag 2010), pp. 220-221; 
The Inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS: WTO Law Considerations’ (2011) ICTSD Global Platform on Climate 
Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy Issue Paper no. 6, p. 4; Hufbauer G, Charnovitz S and Kim J, Global Warming 
and the World Trading System (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics 2009), p. 69. 
71  Along with a whole body of literature supporting the conclusion that an emissions allowance requirement must be 
considered to be a non-fiscal measure (i.e. a regulation), it is noteworthy that the European Union Court of Justice has 
also recently expressed a similar view in the preliminary ruling concerning the ECJ Case C-366/10, Air Transport As-
sociation of America and others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2011], see paras 142-144, 147. 
72 Ecoplan et al. (2013), Border Tax Adjustments: Can energy and carbon taxes be adjusted at the border?, available at 
http://www.efv.admin.ch/e/downloads/finanzpolitik_grundlagen/els/Ecoplan_2013_e.pdf. 
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of the GATT.73 The problem, however, would arise at the implementation 
stage when the determination of the adjustment level (i.e. tax rate imposed 
on imported electricity) would require tracing emissions in electricity. For 
instance, electricity of different origin generated from coal would have dif-
ferent emissions footprints depending on the technology used at coal-fired 
power plants (e.g. whether plants are equipped with carbon capture and 
storage or not).74 The criteria used for determining the tax rate for import-
ed electricity are therefore the crucial factors influencing consistency of 
the tax with WTO law. 
a)  The relation to the CO2 levy scheme currently in place in Switzerland 
As was discussed in section 2.2, Swiss fossil fuel power plants are in prin-
ciple subject to the CO2 levy. However, in practice they benefit from a 
complex system of various exceptions. Therefore, it is questionable 
whether the imposition of the CO2 levy on imported electricity under the 
present circumstances could constitute a BTA measure consistent with 
WTO rules (see Ecoplan, 2013). To legally implement a carbon BTA on 
electricity, a CO2 levy in Switzerland should be levied on domestic fossil 
fuel power plants without exemptions. This would allow an import BTA 
on electricity even in the situation where only a small amount of electricity 
is produced from fossil fuels in Switzerland. In that case, the de facto dis-
crimination effects of the heavier tax burden for imported electricity could 
be defended under GATT Art. XX. 
b) Accounting for the emissions costs paid by importers of fossil fuel-
generated electricity under the EU ETS 
If a tax on fossil-fuel-generated electricity were designed on the basis of 
the carbon content, the similarity of the measure to the charges paid by 
electricity generators for emissions allowances under the EU ETS would 
be greater. Therefore, it would be more difficult to disregard the fact that 
73 Ecoplan et al. (2013), Border Tax Adjustments: Can energy and carbon taxes be adjusted at the border?, pp. 86-87, 96-
97, 100-105. 
74  For an overview of legal issues arising from tracing emissions in final products, see K. Holzer, Carbon-related Border 
Adjustment and WTO Law (Edward Elgar, 2014), pp. 219-233. 
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EU power generators already bear the CO2 costs under the EU ETS and 
not to grant EU electricity imported into Switzerland an exemption from 
(or a reduction of) the Swiss CO2 levy. At the same time, it could be ar-
gued that the CO2 in Switzerland and the costs paid for emissions allow-
ances under the EU ETS are hardly comparable measures considering that 
the rate of the former is fixed by the government, whereas the rate of the 
latter is determined by the supply and demand forces of emissions trading 
(see section 3.1.1.c). Also, it can be argued that the current price of the EU 
emissions allowances does not sufficiently incorporate the environmental 
costs of CO2 emissions, at least not to the extent that the Swiss government 
intends to achieve through the imposition of a CO2 levy on electricity.  
c) Implementation hurdles associated with the use of the current Swiss 
and EU GO systems 
The imposition of a CO2 levy on fossil fuel electricity faces the problem of 
tracing emissions which cannot be solved using the GO systems currently 
in place in Switzerland and the EU. While the Swiss GO system accounts 
for different sources of electricity, including fossil fuel sources, GOs are 
usually used in EU member states to trace renewable sources of electricity. 
Furthermore, neither the Swiss nor EU GO systems account for the CO2 
content of electricity generation. Hence, to tax imported electricity on the 
basis of the CO2 content would require the upgrading of current GO sys-
tems to include information on emissions. Moreover, the CO2 levy on elec-
tricity would not allow for nuclear-generated electricity to be included in 
the scheme, as the generation of electricity from nuclear power is not asso-
ciated with GHG emissions. Thus, with respect to nuclear electricity other 
measures should be considered, if there is a need to stimulate the phasing 
out of nuclear electricity in Switzerland. 
4.1.3 A charge on fossil-fuel-generated electricity designed as a tariff  
a) Tariff differentiation as a climate change policy tool under the GATT 
Switzerland may use a policy of tariff differentiation in relation to imports 
of electricity that would address concerns related to GHG emissions from 
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burning fossil fuels and contribute to the goals of climate change.75 In oth-
er words, Switzerland may introduce in its GATT Schedule of Conces-
sions a distinction of electricity-related tariff lines for the purpose of dif-
ferentiating the tariff treatment applied to imported electricity based upon 
PPM criteria.76 This would imply that a tariff on RE electricity would be 
kept at the current zero rate of bound tariff whereas a tariff on non-
renewable electricity would be raised above zero, thus coming into conflict 
with the provision of Art. II:1(b) GATT.77 Under the third scenario of the 
like products analysis of grey and green electricity, that is where grey and 
green electricity are found to be unlike products, such tariff differentiation 
would need no justification beyond the disciplines on tariff deconsolida-
tion under GATT Art. XXVIII discussed below. However, should green 
electricity and fossil-fuel-generated forms of electricity be considered to 
be like products, Switzerland would need to defend a tariff differentiation 
based on PPMs by claiming that it is pursuing a legitimate public policy 
objective falling under the scope of one or more of the general exceptions 
recognized under Art. XX GATT. This would also presuppose that the ex-
isting FTA with the EU allows the introduction of new tariffs. As ex-
plained below, it is doubtful that this is the case. 
Under this scenario, the first issue that arises is whether the GATT Art. 
XX exceptions apply to violations of Art. II GATT. So far, the WTO case 
law has not specifically addressed the question of the applicability of the 
general exceptions of Art. XX GATT to tariff rules of Art. II:1 (b) 
GATT.78 Nevertheless, it could be argued that the language of the chapeau 
of Art. XX where it says that “nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent the adoption or enforcement…” (emphasis added) of a whole 
range of public policy measures could be interpreted as to allow the ap-
plicability of Art. XX to every substantive rule under the GATT. The idea 
75  Aerni et al., Climate Change and International Law: Exploring the Linkages between Human Rights, Environment, 
Trade and Investment, German Yearbook of International Law, 2010, vol. 53, at 164-166. 
76  At present, Switzerland has included in its Schedule of concessions the commitment to bound to zero its tariff rate on 
electricity. However, under the HS used under WTO law electricity generally comes under the optional heading HS 
2716.0089, without further distinctions between different sources of generation. See Legal Opinion on Differentiated 
Electricity Taxation, fn. 8 above, at 28.  
77  According to Art. II:1 (b) GATT, a Member shall refrain from imposing ordinary custom duties or tariffs in excess to 
those set forth in its Schedule of concessions.  
78  This is in contrast to a whole body of jurisprudence explicitly endorsing the availability of GATT general exceptions 
for violations of the national treatment principle by the application of taxes and domestic regulatory measures under 
Art. III GATT. See, for instance, US-Gasoline; US-Shrimps and Brazil-Retreaded Tyres.  
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that the general exceptions of the GATT “potentially appl[y] to all provi-
sions of the Agreement, including those relating to tariffs in Art. II and 
Art. XXVIII GATT” has already received support in the literature within a 
more general framework of promoting the reconsideration of tariff policies 
as trade-related climate change instruments.79  
Assuming that Art. XX GATT is in principle available as a defence for a 
tariff differentiation on imported electricity, various exceptions may be 
relevant to this end. In light of the underlying rationale of using tariffs as a 
tool for climate change mitigation, the immediate venue for justification of 
tariffs imposed in relation to the source of electricity, whether imposed in 
relation to the carbon footprint of fossil fuel-generated electricity (i.e. 
“carbon” tariff) or not,80 are the health and/or environmental exceptions 
under Art. XX (b) and (g) GATT. The conditions for seeking justification 
under such exceptions were discussed in the Legal Opinion on Differenti-
ated Electricity Taxation. One general conclusion reached in that docu-
ment was that the health exception under Art. XX (b) is more convincing 
as a justification for differential treatment of RE electricity and nuclear 
electricity,81 whereas Art. XX (g) could be more suitable for explaining 
differential treatment of RE electricity and fossil fuel-generated electrici-
ty.82 In the case of tariff instruments, however, Art. XX (g) may entail an 
additional hurdle as it requires that a measure relating to the conservation 
of natural resources is taken “in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption”. In this respect, the very fact that Switzerland 
would be imposing a tariff would per se exclude a similar type of instru-
ment being applied to electricity produced internally. Accordingly, one op-
tion for Switzerland would be to put in place a differentiated electricity tax 
in parallel to a tariff on the source of fossil fuel electricity.83 Alternatively, 
Switzerland could opt for the introduction of “carbon” tariffs on fossil-
fuel-generated electricity and claim that the existing Swiss legislation on 
79  T Cottier, O Nartova and A Shingal, The Potential of Tariff Policy for Climate Change Mitigation: Legal and Econom-
ic Analysis, Journal of World Trade (2014), forthcoming. 
80  Should the tariff differentiation be based on the carbon footprint of fossil fuel-generated electricity (i.e. a carbon tariff), 
it would be possible to also distinguish between different forms of grey electricity.  
81  See fn. 8 above, at 35. 
82  Ibid, at 36. 
83  The co-existence of such instruments would be legal under GATT rules as discussed in section b) below.  
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the CO2 levy and the emissions trading system could qualify under the 
even-handedness requirement imposed by Art. XX(g) GATT.84 
Another potential avenue for justification could be Art. XX (d) GATT. 
Under this exception, Switzerland could justify measures “necessary to se-
cure compliance with law or regulations that are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of [the GATT]…”.  According to WTO jurisprudence in order 
to sustain an Art. XX (d) defence two prerequisites must be met: (i) the 
measure must be designed to “secure compliance” with “laws or regula-
tions” that are “not inconsistent” with WTO law; (ii) the measure must be 
“necessary” to secure such compliance.85 With regard to the first element, 
Switzerland would need to identify the law or regulations with which the 
imposition of tariffs on grey electricity seeks to secure compliance. As a 
climate change rationale ultimately subsumes the differentiation between 
RE and non-RE electricity tariff treatment, Switzerland could in principle 
present supporting evidence that the application of a tariff on non-
renewable forms of electricity is meant to secure compliance with the CO2 
Act or any eventual piece of legislation aimed at establishing a differenti-
ated electricity tax.86 Importantly, the domestic measure invoked must 
firstly not in itself be GATT-inconsistent. In Colombia – Ports of Entry the 
Panel opined that the fact that one provision in a country’s regulation is 
WTO-inconsistent does not necessarily mean that any or all of the provi-
sions are incompatible as well and therefore considered this requirement to 
be satisfied notwithstanding the fact that several provisions of the measure 
at issue were WTO incompatible.87  
84  In principle, the argument could also be made that the existing system of CO2 taxation and/or the Swiss ETS could 
represent proof of fulfilment of the even-handedness requirement also if Switzerland decided to apply a tariff based on 
the source of fossil fuel electricity. Such a tariff differentiation policy would ultimately aim at discouraging grey forms 
of electricity for climate change purposes. For the existence of the territorial nexus required by Art. XX GATT, see Le-
gal Opinion on Differentiated Electricity Taxation, fn. 8 above, at 36. 
85  Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, Panel Report, WT/DS371/R, circulated 
on 15 November 2010, paras 7.749-758.  
86  The WTO case law is in fact clear with respect to the possibility of invoking national law or regulations only. In Mexi-
co – Taxes on Soft Drinks, in particular, the Panel elaborated on this point and clarified that the use of the terms “law” 
or “regulations” in the GATT Agreement “relate principally to domestic rules” and not to obligations under interna-
tional agreements”. Moreover, it opined that the phrase “to secure compliance” does not apply to measures taken by a 
Member in order to induce another Member to comply with obligations owed to it under a non-WTO treaty”. See paras 
8.162-204. Hence, Switzerland could in no way invoke the existence of either its own or other countries’ international 
commitments on emission reduction targets undertaken within the UNFCCC regime.  
87  Colombia – Ports of Entry, Panel Report, paras 7.526-532.  
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Second, the tariff differentiation must be proved to “enforce compliance” 
with such domestic legislation,88 thus effectively securing the attainment 
of its objectives.89 This requirement relates to the second element imposed 
by Art. XX (d) GATT, i.e. the measure must be “necessary” to the en-
forcement of a law or regulation. The necessity test under Art. XX (d) has 
been interpreted by WTO dispute settlement bodies similarly to that under 
Art. XX (b) GATT. In other words, for a measure to be deemed necessary, 
there must be no alternative, less restrictive, measure available which can 
equally achieve the same level of enforcement with respect to the pursued 
objective.90 In this respect, although it is not clear whether tariffs on non-
renewable forms of electricity can be considered to be the least restrictive 
available measure, the fact that the tariff is applied to address important 
public interests may influence a decision under the necessity test. WTO 
case law on Art. XX (d) recognizes that “a treaty interpreter assessing a 
measure claimed to be necessary to secure compliance of a WTO-
consistent law or regulation may, in appropriate cases, take into account 
the relative importance of the common interests or values that the law or 
regulation to be enforced is intended to protect. The more vital or im-
portant those common interests or values are, the easier it would be to ac-
cept as ‘necessary’ a measure designed as an enforcement instrument”.91 
Hence, the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions for the purposes of 
climate change mitigation is likely to be considered a “vital” interest ap-
propriate to locate a tariff on fossil-fuel-generated electricity “closer to the 
pole of ‘indispensable’ than to the opposite pole of simply ‘making a con-
tribution to’”,92 thus qualifying it as “necessary” within the meaning of 
Art. XX (d) GATT.   
Finally, it should be recalled that once a differentiated tariff is provisional-
ly justified under one of the above-mentioned general exceptions under 
Art. XX GATT, it would also have to satisfy the conditions of the chapeau 
88  See Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, Panel Report, paras 8.170-181.  
89  In Canada – Periodicals, in particular, the Panel clarified that a measure cannot be regarded as an enforcement measure 
within the meaning of the phrase “to secure compliance” under Art. XX (d) GATT only because it may accomplish 
some of the goals of the relevant domestic “law or regulation” as a mere “incidental effect”. See Panel Report paras 
5.6-11. 
90  See Korea – Beef, AB Report, paras 159-170; Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, Panel Report, paras 7.203-232.  
91  Korea – Beef, AB Report, cit., paras 162-3; see also Canada – Wheat, Panel Report, paras 6.220-251.  
92  Korea – Beef, AB Report, cit., para. 161.  
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of Art. XX. The requirements imposed by the chapeau have been exam-
ined in detail in the Legal Opinion on Differentiated Electricity Taxation.93 
Very recently, the AB discussed at length the implications of the analysis 
under the chapeau. In particular, it clarified that the chapeau “entails an as-
sessment of whether the ‘conditions’ prevailing in the countries between 
which the measure allegedly discriminates are the same”.94 Moreover, it 
specified that “only ‘conditions’ that are relevant for the purpose of estab-
lishing arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in the light of the specific 
character of the measure at issue and the circumstances of a particular case 
should be considered …”.95 Accordingly, it opined that “in conducting this 
assessment, the subparagraph under which a measure has been provisional-
ly justified, as well as the provision of the GATT with which a measure 
has been found to be inconsistent, provide important context”.96 It thus 
concluded that “the question is thus whether the conditions prevailing in 
different countries are relevantly the same”.97  
On the basis of this recent AB ruling, Switzerland would thus need to 
show that the “conditions” prevailing domestically, on the one hand, and 
in the EU (or in any country potentially exporting electricity to Switzer-
land), on the other hand, are “relevantly different”. In this respect, it seems 
likely that Switzerland could not succssfully rely on the existence of a do-
mestic ETS since the EU has a similar system in place in its territory. 
However, the existence of an advanced CO2 levy system or of a compre-
hensive scheme of differentiated taxation according to the source of elec-
tricity could be considered as important elements to show that “conditions” 
in Switzerland and the EU are relevantly different with respect to the pur-
sued objective of GHG emission reductions for climate change mitigation 
purposes.   
Finally, GATT Art. XXVIII allows WTO members to modify their tariff 
concessions. However, when considering tariffs as a policy option for elec-
tricity, it should be kept in mind that import duties may be increased be-
93  See fn. 8 above, at 36-37. 
94  EC – Seals Products, AB Report, para. 5.317. 
95  Ibid, para. 5.299 (emphasis not added).  
96  Ibid, para. 5.317.  
97  Ibid, para. 5.299 (emphasis not added). 
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yond the bound tariff rates only after the deconsolidation of bound tariffs. 
Even if a deconsolidation were compatible with the Switzerland–EEC 
1972 FTA, it presupposes prior consultations with a subset of those WTO 
members that hold initial negotiating rights and have the principle supply-
ing interests or substantial interests.98 The agreement with these WTO 
members would normally be linked to compensation by Switzerland so 
that overall levels of access to the Swiss market could be maintained. 
Should this agreement fail, Switzerland would still be free to raise tariffs 
unilaterally, although this would risk retaliation from EU member states, 
which could withdraw equivalent concessions in the same or other sec-
tors.99  
b) The relationship between a tariff on fossil fuel electricity and a differenti-
ated electricity tax  
The application of a tariff to fossil fuel electricity raises the question of 
whether the tariff could be applied in parallel to a differentiated electricity 
tax system as discussed in section 3.1.1. The answer to this question re-
quires an analysis of the relationship between a customs duty (tariff) and 
an internal tax imposed on imports or a BTA.100 
The difference between tariffs (customs duties) as defined by GATT Art. 
II:1(b) and internal taxes applied to imports as defined by GATT Art. III:2 
(and Ad Art. III) has been addressed in GATT/WTO jurisprudence. In the 
1952 case Belgian Family Allowances, the Panel considered a levy collect-
ed on products purchased by public bodies and charged, not at the time of 
importation, but when the purchase price was paid by the public body to 
constitute an “internal charge” within the meaning of Art. III:2 GATT and 
not an import charge for the purposes of Art. II:1 (b) GATT.101 The 1978 
Panel Report on EEC – Measures on Animal Feed Proteins considered the 
fact that the EEC regulation at issue applied to both imported and domesti-
cally produced vegetable proteins contributed to the conclusion that such a 
98  See Understanding on the Interpretation of Art. XXVIII of GATT 1994. 
99  Cottier, Nartova, and Shingal, at fn. 79 above. 
100  A BTA is considered to be a charge enforced at the border under GATT Art. II:2(a), III:2 and Ad Art. III. See K. 
Holzer (2010), Proposals on Carbon-Related Border Adjustments, Carbon and Climate Law Review, 4(1), at 53-54. 
101  G/32, adopted on 7 November 1952, 1S/59, para. 2. 
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measure could not be considered as a border measure under Art. II GATT, 
but should be examined as an internal measure within the meaning of Art. 
III:2 GATT.102 In the 1985 Panel Report Canada – Measures Affecting the 
Sale of Gold Coins, the Panel excluded the possibility that a retail sales tax 
could fall under the scope of Art. II GATT when levied at the time of retail 
sale of goods within a territory, and not at the time of importation.103 
The Panel Report on EEC – Regulation on Imports of Parts and Compo-
nents recalled that “the distinction between import duties and internal 
charges is of fundamental importance because the General Agreement reg-
ulates ordinary customs duties, other import charges and internal taxes dif-
ferently: the imposition of ‘ordinary customs duties’ for the purpose of 
protection is allowed unless they exceed tariff bindings; all other duties or 
charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation are in 
principle prohibited in respect of bound items (Art. II:1(b)). By contrast, 
internal taxes that discriminate against imported products are prohibited, 
whether or not the items concerned are bound (Art. III:2)”.104 Against this 
background, the Panel elaborated on whether the policy purpose of a 
charge is relevant to the issue of whether the charge is imposed in ‘connec-
tion with importation’ within the meaning of Art.II:1(b). It concluded that, 
according to the text of Art. II:1 (b) and Art. III:2, it “is not the policy pur-
pose attributed to the charge but rather whether the charge is due on im-
portation or at the time or point of importation or whether it is collected in-
ternally”.105 Furthermore, the Panel stated that, because “the policy pur-
pose of charges is frequently difficult to determine objectively […], [o]nly 
at the expense of creating substantial legal uncertainty could the policy 
purpose of a charge be considered to be relevant in determining whether 
the charge falls under Art. II:1(b) or Art. III:2”.106 Finally, the Panel ex-
cluded the possibility that the mere description or categorization of a 
charge under the domestic law of a contracting party is relevant to deter-
102  However, the Panel did not exclude in principle the possibility that a measure could be examined “both as internal 
measures under Art. III and border measures under Art. II”. L/4599, adopted on 14 March 1978, 25S/49, 66-67, para. 
4.15.  
103  L/5863, unadopted, dated September 1985, para. 50.  
104  L/6657, adopted on 16 May 1990, 37S/132,191-192, para.5.4.  
105  Ibid., para. 5.6. 
106  Ibid., para. 5.6. 
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mining whether it is subject to the requirements of Art. II or those of Art. 
III:2. To conclude otherwise, according to the Panel, would imply that 
“contracting parties could determine themselves which of these provisions 
would apply to their charges”, ultimately running counter to “the basic ob-
jective underlying Articless II and III, namely that discrimination against 
products from other contracting parties should only take the form of ordi-
nary customs duties imposed on or in connection with importation and not 
the form of internal taxes”.107  
Similarly, a report of a subcommittee at the Havana Conference stated that 
“the fact that … charges are described as internal taxes in the laws of the 
importing country would not in itself have the effect of giving them the 
status of internal taxes…”.108 Thus, the term used for describing a particu-
lar measure does not determine whether the measure should be classified 
as a customs duty, internal tax or a BTA. Also the Harmonized Commodi-
ty Description and Coding System (the ‘Harmonized System’) of the 
World Customs Organization, which is used as a basis for countries’ 
Schedules of Concessions cannot be considered a decisive factor for the 
differentiation between a customs duty and an internal tax.109 
The difference between ordinary customs duties under first sentence of 
Art. II:1(b) and internal taxes or other internal charges under Art. III:2 was 
further clarified by the WTO jurisprudence. In China – Auto Parts the AB 
found that  
“(T)he moment at which a charge is collected or paid is not determinative 
of whether it is an ordinary customs duty or an internal charge. Ordinary 
customs duties may be collected after the moment of importation, and in-
ternal charges may be collected at the moment of importation (footnote 
omitted). For a charge to constitute an ordinary customs duty, however, the 
obligation to pay it must accrue at the moment and by virtue of or, in the 
words of Art. II:1(b), ‘on’, importation”.110 
107  Ibid., para. 5.7. 
108  Havana Reports, at 62, para. 42. 
109  China-Auto-Parts, AB Report, paras 155 and 163. 
110  Ibid., para 158. 
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Thus, customs duties and internal taxes mainly differ with respect to the 
moment when the authority is entitled to impose the measure and when 
this measure must be complied with. Also important is whether the obliga-
tion to comply with a measure is determined by factors which are external 
or internal to the country concerned (is the obligation to comply with the 
measure triggered by the fact that a certain good is imported into the coun-
try or that it is put on sale or is reused in the country?).  
“... (I)n examining the scope of application of Art. III:2, in relation to Art. 
II:1(b), first sentence, the time at which a charge is collected or paid is not 
decisive. … (A) key indicator of whether a charge constitutes an “internal 
charge” within the meaning of Art. III:2 of the GATT 1994 is whether the 
obligation to pay such charge accrues because of an internal factor (e.g., 
because the product was re-sold internally or because the product was used 
internally), in the sense that such ‘internal factor’ occurs after the importa-
tion of the product of one Member into the territory of another Mem-
ber…”.111 
In the China – Auto Parts case, the AB came to the conclusion that a 
charge could not be qualified as an import duty but could be qualified as 
an internal tax on the basis that the declaration of payment of a charge was 
made after motor vehicles were assembled on the market of China and not 
at the time when automobile parts were imported into China.112 Applying 
the logic used by the AB in China – Auto Parts, we come to the conclusion 
that the imposition of a charge on fossil fuel electricity is driven by inter-
nal factors (selling electricity on the market of Switzerland), rather than by 
external factors (complying with a clearance procedure). Also the moment 
at which the obligation to pay a charge on fossil fuel electricity occurs 
does not seem to be the moment of importation, but rather the moment of 
selling electricity to the consumer on the Swiss internal market. Thus, the 
criteria for distinguishing between customs duties and internal taxes used 
by the AB in China – Auto Parts would put a charge on fossil fuel electric-
ity into the category of internal taxes falling under GATT Art. III:2 and not 
under GATT Art. II:1(b). This is even more so if one considers that, ac-
111  Ibid, paras 162-163.  
112  Ibid, para 173. 
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cording to previous jurisprudence, it is apparently difficult to argue that the 
rationale declaratorily attached to a measure could be relevant to determin-
ing whether a measure could be considered a tariff falling under the scope 
of Art. II:1 (b) or an internal tax or other internal charge within the mean-
ing of Art. III:2.113 
Finally, it should be mentioned that a fiscal measure imposed on fossil fuel 
electricity could not be considered to be a tariff and a tax at the same time. 
In India – Additional Import Duties, the AB noted that ‘Art. II:2(a), sub-
ject to the conditions stated therein, exempts a charge from the coverage of 
Art. II:1(b)’,114 thus taking it under the scope of Art. III:2. 
In conclusion, a tariff on fossil fuel electricity could be applied in parallel 
to the differentiated electricity tax system, which has been discussed in the 
Legal Opinion on Differentiated Electricity Taxation. In this respect, the 
existence of a domestic tax scheme that gives different treatment to do-
mestically produced RE and non-renewable forms of electricity may in-
crease the chances of successfully defending a tariff differentiation policy 
under Art. XX (d) and (g) GATT (see section 3.1.3 a).  
c)  Implementation hurdles associated with tracing the source and the 
CO2 content of electricity under the current EU GO system 
If the tariff differentiation is based on the source of electricity, the GO sys-
tem as currently implemented at the EU level could be useful only to the 
extent that the tariff policy aims at distinguishing between RE electricity 
and non-renewable forms of electricity. In this respect, Switzerland could 
in practical terms impose a tariff on the importation of all electricity flows 
not accompanied by a RE GO. This would include both nuclear electricity 
and different forms of fossil-fuel-generated electricity. The different treat-
ment of nuclear electricity may in principle be defended under Art. XX (b) 
GATT115 whereas, depending on the regime applied to internally produced 
electricity, justification for different tariff rates applied to fossil fuel elec-
tricity may be sought under Art. XX (d) or (g) GATT (see section 3.1.3 a). 
113  See the Panel Report on EEC – Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, paras. 5.5-5.8. 
114  India-Additional Import Duties, AB Report, para 153. 
115  See fn. 8, at 35. 
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However, this type of GO system would neither allow differential treat-
ment between nuclear and fossil fuel-generated electricity, nor distinguish-
ing between different forms of more or less polluting fossil-fuel-genereted 
electricity.  
An alternative could be to adopt a “carbon” tariff. However, as already 
discussed in section 3.1.2.c, the GO system, as it currently exists in the 
EU, could not be used for tracing the CO2 content of different forms of 
non-renewable electricity, as already discussed in section 3.1.2.c. It is not 
clear whether nuclear electricity would need to be treated similarly to RE 
electricity under such a scheme, due to its carbon neutrality.   
4.1.4 Options for taxing imported nuclear electricity 
The possibility of applying a differentiated tax rate for domestic and im-
ported nuclear electricity, including the possibility to justify it under the 
general exceptions of Art. XX GATT, was analysed in the Legal Opinion 
on Differentiated Electricity Taxation.116 In this subsection, we look into 
the possibility of applying a tax solely on imported nuclear electricity.  
The conditions to be taken into account for legal assessment are different 
to those relating to the application of a tax on imported fossil fuel electrici-
ty. Switzerland produces a considerable amount of electricity from nuclear 
sources. The application of a tax solely on imported nuclear electricity 
would imply a violation of the national treatment rule, in so far as domes-
tic nuclear electricity enjoys a more favourable treatment. Against this 
backdrop, the previously discussed design options for implementing a tax 
on imported fossil fuel electricity would have the following implications 
when applied to imported nuclear electricity. Under the first option, an 
electricity tax would be linked to the source of electricity, targeting nuclear 
electricity generation. In this case the chances that nuclear electricity 
would be considered to be an unlike product to fossil fuel and RE electrici-
ty are slim. Imposing a tax only on nuclear electricity would require justi-
fication under Art. XX (as a measure necessary to protect public health 
and, possibly, also related to environmental risks). Yet, the imposition of a 
tax only on imported nuclear electricity where the same risks are associat-
116  See fn. 8. 
51 
 
                                                 
ed with domestic production would prevent the successful defence of the 
measure under Art. XX. That would imply that a tax should equally apply 
to both domestic and imported nuclear electricity. Moreover, this design 
option faces the same problem of tracing the source of imported electricity 
as discussed in section 3.1.1.  
The second option cannot be applied to nuclear electricity taxation, as it is 
based on the CO2 content of electricity, whereas nuclear electricity is CO2 
neutral.  
The instrument of import tariffs under the third option faces legal con-
straints when applied to nuclear electricity. Deconsolidation of bound tar-
iffs for nuclear electricity could in principle be done under Article XXVIII 
GATT subject to compensation and the introduction of process based dis-
tinctions in the tariff classification. Yet, in the European context, deconsol-
idation faces main obstacles within the Switzerland-EEC 1972 FTA which 
does not provide for this option. 
In conclusion, in light of the legal issues associated with the existence of 
domestic nuclear power generation in Switzerland, nuclear electricity 
should be taxed within the framework of a comprehensive differentiated 
electricity tax scheme equally applicable to both domestic and imported 
electricity, such as the one discussed in the Legal Opinion on Differentiat-
ed Electricity Taxation.  
4.1.5 Taxation of imported electricity and subsidies disciplines under WTO 
law 
Some of the options for differentiated taxation of imported electricity men-
tioned above may raise questions in relation to their compatibility with 
WTO disciplines on subsidies. A detailed analysis of the respective legal 
background has been provided in the Legal Opinion on Differentiated 
Electricity Taxation117 and therefore only a short compatibility analysis is 
provided here.   
It should be noted at the outset that the question of subsidies will arise only 
if energy tax or a CO2 tax is applied only to imported electricity from fos-
117  See fn.8, at p. 36 et seqq. 
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sil fuels and nuclear power. In this case, the tax scheme will have to be 
scrutinized under a four-step test.118 First, it is necessary to determine 
whether there is a financial contribution by the government or any public 
body. Given the language of Art. 1.1(a)(ii) ASCM, financial contribution 
includes fiscal incentives where government revenue, which is otherwise 
due is foregone. It is generally recognized that the notion of “otherwise 
due” depends on the rules of taxation that the WTO member established. 
In order to identify what is in fact “due” in Switzerland the panel will have 
to analyse the energy/CO2 levy on imported electricity based on three cri-
teria: 
1. Comparison between the tax treatment applicable to the alleged subsidy 
recipients (the objective reason behind the differential treatment should be 
taken into consideration); 
2. Benchmark for comparison – tax treatment of comparable income of com-
parably situated taxpayers, whereas structure of domestic tax regime and 
its organizing principles play an important role; 
3. Comparing reasons for the challenged tax treatment with the benchmark 
tax treatment.119 
In a case with a different energy tax on imported electricity from that im-
posed on fossil fuels it is very probable that the element of financial con-
tribution will be established. The same is true for the CO2 tax on imported 
electricity, as the large fossil-fuel power plants in Switzerland are subject 
to a 100% compensation obligation, and mid-scale fossil-fuel power plants 
are subject to the Swiss ETS, and therefore the CO2 tax is reimbursed to 
them. 
The second element that has to be analysed is whether the financial contri-
bution confers a benefit to the Swiss electricity producers. Similarly to the 
conclusions in the Legal Opinion on Differentiated Electricity Taxation120 
and based on the same arguments we would suggest that the finding of a 
benefit conferred by a differential tax would depend on the magnitude of 
118  Art. 1 and 2 ASCM. 
119  Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint), supra, para. 831. 
120  See fn. 8, at p. 40-41. 
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the difference between the tax rate on imported electricity from fossil fuels 
in light of the capital costs of green electricity production.  
The third element, namely the specificity of the subsidy has a high proba-
bility of being met. 
Finally, similarly to our conclusions for Options B and C in the Legal 
Opinion on Differentiated Electricity Taxation121 the last key element of 
the analysis is the determination of a possible adverse effect. The latter 
would have place if a future taxation scheme would lead to significant 
sales losses or significant price suppression of the imported electricity, or 
to displacement or impedance of imports of such electricity. The exact an-
swer to the question of compatibility would depend on the specific modali-
ties of the measure. 
4.2 EU law 
4.2.1 Compatibility of an import tariff with EU law 
The conditions governing tariffs on imports from a non-EU country into 
the EU are in principle subject to multilateral trade rules, such as in partic-
ular the above-mentioned WTO and GATT rules, and bilateral trade ar-
rangements, such as the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA. 
Meanwhile, trade between the EU member states is governed exclusively 
by the rules of the EU legal order. Arts. 28 and 30 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) are among the main corner-
stones of the relevant EU legal framework. Whilst Art. 28 TFEU estab-
lishes the principle of the creation of a customs union, Art. 30 TFEU pro-
hibits all customs duties on imports and exports and charges having equiv-
alent effect between EU member states. Accordingly, the introduction of a 
new tariff on trade in electricity between EU member states would be con-
sidered incompatible with the very essence of the EU rules concerning the 
creation of a customs union and an internal market, irrespective of the ob-
jectives pursued by the tax measure. 
121  See fn. 8, at p. 61. 
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Art. 30 TFEU does not only provide for the abolition of custom duties, but 
also of charges having equivalent effect. For the purposes of this provi-
sion, a charge having equivalent effect is a pecuniary charge, other than a 
custom duty, which is levied on goods exported from another EU member 
state by reason of the fact that the goods cross the border, irrespective of 
the denomination used to describe the charge under consideration, the lev-
el of the charge, or the manner by which the charge is levied.122 Moreover, 
a pecuniary charge is characterised by the fact that it is either not imposed 
in the same way on similar or comparable domestic products, or it does not 
fall, in the absence of such products, within the framework of general in-
ternal taxation. Neither is it intended to compensate for such internal taxa-
tion.123 Otherwise, the charge may be considered a tax measure and differ-
ent rules apply. If the pecuniary charge meets these conditions it must be 
abolished and it is irrelevant whether or not the charge is levied for the 
benefit of the State, is discriminatory or protective or the good is in com-
petition with a domestic good.124 
For these reasons, it would not be possible to impose a custom duty or a 
charge having equivalent effect on the trade with electricity from fossil 
fuels between EU member states. This is because the EU is based on a cus-
toms union. 
4.2.2 Compatibility of a levy with EU law 
a) Obligations flowing from harmonised tax rules 
The introduction by a member state of the EU of an environmentally relat-
ed levy on electricity generated from fossil fuels, by contrast, is in princi-
ple possible. This is an area which has been the object of several harmoni-
zation measures:  
122  ECJ, Judgment of 5 February 1976, Case 87/75, Conceria Daniele Bresciani, ECR 1976 129, para. 9; see also Seiler in: 
Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Art. 110 TFEU, para. 19 seq.; Herrmann in: 
Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim, op. cit., Art. 30 TFEU, para. 9. 
123  ECJ, Judgment of 1st July 1969, Commission/Republic of Italy, Case 24/68, ECR 1969 193, para. 11. 
124  ECJ, Judgment of 1st July 1969, Commission/Republic of Italy, Case 24/68, ECR 1969 193, para. 9. 
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• Art. 1 (1) (a) of Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 
concerning the general arrangements for excise duties and repealing Di-
rective 92/12/EEC125 lays down general rules concerning excise duties 
which are levied either directly or indirectly on the consumption of energy 
products and electricity. 
• Directive 2008/118/EC refers to Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 Oc-
tober 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of en-
ergy products and electricity,126 which introduces certain minimum taxa-
tion levels, as already mentioned in our previous legal opinion concerning 
a differential energy tax. According to Art. 15 (1) b, c and d of the Di-
rective, Member States may apply under fiscal control total or partial ex-
emptions or reductions in the level of taxation among other things to elec-
tricity, which is either of solar, wind, wave, tidal or geothermal origin; of 
hydraulic origin produced in hydroelectric installations; generated from 
biomass or from products produced from biomass; generated from me-
thane emitted by abandoned coalmines; or generated from fuel cells. The 
exemptions or reductions may furthermore be applied to energy products 
and electricity used for combined heat and power generation and under 
certain circumstances to electricity produced from combined heat and 
power generation. The tax reduction or exemption may also be implement-
ed by means of a refund of the tax paid by the user to the energy producer, 
by virtue to Art. 15 (2) of the Directive. Furthermore, Art. 14 (1) (a) of Di-
rective 2003/96/EC introduces the principle of an “output taxation”, ac-
cording to which “energy products and electricity used to produce electric-
ity and electricity used to maintain the ability to produce electricity” shall 
as a rule be exempt from taxation. 
However, this principle is not absolute for a number of reasons, including 
the following: 
• First, EU member states may nevertheless subject the energy products 
concerned to taxation “for reasons of environmental policy” without hav-
ing to respect the minimum levels of taxation laid down in this Directive. 
According to a proposal submitted by the European Commission on 13 
125  Official Journal (OJ) L 9 of 14/01/2009, p. 12. 
126  OJ L 283 of 31.10.2003, p.51. 
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April 2011,127 member states may in the future only invoke this exception 
if environmental reasons other than the objective of reducing CO2 emis-
sions are concerned. The fate of the proposed renewal of Directive 
2003/96/EC is currently uncertain. The Commission acknowledged prior 
to a meeting of the EU Finance Ministers on 20 June 2014 that there was 
“no sign of a political compromise” and that the upcoming Italian Presi-
dency would continue working on the file.128   
• Secondly, only those energy products which are concerned by the Di-
rective are in principle exempted from a levy. This is particularly relevant 
for uranium, which is not explicitly mentioned in the Directive129 and an 
application of the Directive per analogy seems doubtful.130 As a conse-
quence of a referral for a preliminary ruling by the Hamburg Finance 
Court of 19 November 2011, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(ECJ) may possibly have to provide guidance whether the output taxation 
principle prohibits a levy on nuclear fuel.131  
It is also important to note that the “output taxation principle” does not 
mean that the energy suppliers concerned are exempt from a participation 
in the Emission Trading System (ETS). In other words, the EU member 
states have currently no obligation to take into account the costs of emis-
sion allowances when setting tax rates for electricity.  
It is possible that the energy inputs will in the future also be subject to a 
tax on the CO2 content, in addition to an ETS allowance according to the 
above mentioned Commission proposal for a revision of Directive 
2003/96/EC. However, the precise conditions are still subject to negotia-
tions between the EU Member States. The General-Secretariat explained in 
a progress report on the negotiations of 3 June 2014 that the Council was 
127  COM (2011) 169 final. 
128 European Commission, press release of 18 June 2014 on the “Preparation of Economic and Finance Ministers Council, 
Luxembourg 20 June”, MEMO/14/428.  
129 Jatzke, ZfZ 2010, 278 281. 
130 This is at least the opinion defended by Martini, Die Kernbrennstoffsteuer – ein steuerrechtlicher Störfall? Offene ver-
fassungs- und unionsrechtliche Fragen, ZUR 2012, 219, 227; apparently also Jatzke, ibidem; contra Kube, Kernbrenn-
stofsteuer und EU-Sekundärrecht, IStR 2012, 553, 556. 
131  Referral for a preliminary ruling in the case 4 K 122/13; see press release of the „Finanzgericht Hamburg“ of 
19/11/2013, http.//justiz.hamburg.de (26/05/2014); see also the judgement of the “Finanzgericht Hamburg” of 
11/04/2014  in the injunction proceeding 4 V 154/13, http://justiz.hamburg.de/contentblob/4302476/data/4-k-154-
13.pdf (26/05/2014), pp. 20 seq. with further references. 
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mindful to base taxation on an energy-related and a CO2-related compo-
nents and that the Member States would have the option to express their 
national tax levels either as one single rate or as separate components.132 
Furthermore, installations falling within the ETS could possibly be taxed 
at specific minimum rates, according to a compromise proposal of 23 Jan-
uary 2014. However, the Council noted that additional work was needed in 
this and other areas to achieve further progress towards a final compro-
mise. It also noted that the link between the method of calculation of the 
minimum levels of taxation and the compatibility with EU state aid law 
had been assessed by the Greek Presidency, but that these findings were 
only provisional pending the outcome of the on-going reforms in the state 
aid field. 
b) Obligation flowing from provisions of primary EU law 
When applying their internal tax measures, the EU member states must ob-
serve the provisions of EU primary law, including the state aid prohibition 
pursuant to Art. 107 (1) TFEU and the prohibition of discriminatory taxa-
tion within the meaning of Art. 110 TFEU. Both provisions have already 
been discussed extensively in our previous legal opinion. We shall there-
fore limit ourselves to some brief comments. 
(1) State aid prohibition 
Imposing a levy on electricity from fossil fuels and nuclear energy neces-
sarily implies that other categories of electricity – which are generated 
from renewable sources – are treated more favourably. This could possibly 
give rise to concerns from a state aid perspective. However, the fact alone 
that a certain kind of electricity is exempt from a levy does not mean that 
one can automatically assume a finding of state aid. Rather, this depends 
on the various criteria which form part of the substantive state aid test. In 
particular, state aid must be selective in order to be relevant in this context. 
This is the case if the difference in treatment corresponds to an economic 
benefit which is selective in favour of certain companies or economic sec-
132 Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the 
Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity, Progress Report of 3 June 2014 by the Gen-
eral-Secretariat of the Council to the Permanent Representatives Committee/Council, 2011/0092 (CNS), 10417/14. 
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tors. There is no selectivity if the measure under consideration, although 
conferring an advantage on its recipient, is justified by the nature or gen-
eral scheme of the tax system of which it is part. 133  Consequently, there is 
no state aid if the member state concerned is able to demonstrate that the 
measure results directly from the basic or guiding principles of its tax sys-
tem. A distinction must be made between, on the one hand, the objectives 
attributed to a particular tax scheme which are extrinsic to it and, on the 
other, the mechanisms inherent in the tax system itself which are necessary 
for the achievement of such objectives. Differences in taxation resulting 
from an objective that is unrelated to the tax system of which they form 
part cannot circumvent the requirements under Art. 107 (1) TFEU.134    
Accordingly, one must first identify the common or “normal” regime ap-
plicable in the Member State concerned. Subsequently, one needs to de-
termine whether the measure derogates from that common regime inas-
much as it differentiates between economic operators who, in the light of 
the objective assigned to the tax system of the particular State, are in a 
comparable factual and legal situation.135 This means in essence that one 
must assess, in light of the environmental objective of a levy on electricity 
from fossil and nuclear origins, whether there is an unjustified tax differen-
tiation to the detriment of certain goods or technologies.136  Even if one 
were to consider that Switzerland may legitimately grant an advantage to 
green electricity suppliers, the fact of excluding certain other green tech-
nologies may put into doubt the legitimacy of the measure from a state aid 
perspective. 
If the levy is exclusively imposed on imports the risk of a negative as-
sessment from a state aid perspective increases considerably. 
 
  
133  ECJ, Case C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline, ECR 2001, I-8365, para. 42; Case 88/03, Portugal v 
Commission, ECR 2006, I-7115, para. 52. 
134  See the summary of the case law by the GC, Judgement of 07/03/2012, Case T-210/02 RENV, British 
Aggregates, para. 46 - 48.  
135  GC, Judgement of 07/03/2012, Case T-210/02 RENV, British Aggregates, para. 49. 
136  GC, Judgement of 07/03/2012, Case T-210/02 RENV, British Aggregates, para. 68 seq. 
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 (2) Prohibition of discriminatory taxation 
First, we need to determine whether an EU member state may legitimately 
apply a certain levy exclusively to electricity from a certain source, alt-
hough most if not all of the electricity concerned is imported. Under such 
circumstances, one may indeed wonder if the levy does not constitute a 
covert import tariff, which is intended to put imported electricity at a cost 
disadvantage.  
According to the ECJ’s case law, a pecuniary charge is not deemed to be a 
tariff (custom duty) or a charge having equivalent effect simply because it 
concerns a product which is not produced domestically. This also applies 
to pecuniary charges which are in principle imposed indiscriminately on 
imported and domestic products but in practice apply almost exclusively to 
imports because domestic production is extremely small, provided the lev-
ies are part of a coherent system of internal dues, applied systematically to 
categories of products irrespective of their origin.137 Rather, the distinction 
between custom duties (tariffs) and charges having equivalent effect, on 
the one hand, and internal taxes, on the other hand, essentially depends on 
whether the pecuniary charge under consideration exclusively targets im-
ports or rather, is part of a system of taxes and levies, which concerns in-
discriminately imported and domestic goods according to objective crite-
ria.138 Under such circumstances, a levy that is specifically imposed on 
imports but forms nevertheless an integral part of the taxation system, it is 
in principle deemed a tax, and not a tariff. 
When carrying out this distinction one also needs to have regard to the 
way how the proceeds from the tax are redistributed. If a surcharge is lev-
ied indiscriminately on imported and domestic goods and the proceeds are 
refunded to compensate the surcharge on the domestic goods the following 
distinction applies.139 
137  ECJ, Judgment of 7 July 1987, Case 193/85, Co-Frutta, ECR 1987 2085, para. 14; Judgment of 16 July 1992, Case C-
343/90, Manuel Jose Lourenco Dias/Director da Alfandega do Porto, ECR 1992 I-4673, para. 53. 
138  ECJ, Judgement of 1st July 1969, Case 24/68 – Commission/Republic of Italy, ECR 1969 193, para. 11. 
139  Herrmann in: Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Art. 30 TFEU, para. 19. 
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• If the proceeds of the levy are used to partly compensate the levy on the 
domestic goods the charge is deemed to be a tax within the meaning of 
Art. 110 TFEU. Should this result in discrimination against imports, then 
the charge may have to be prohibited or adapted.140 Whether or not this is 
necessary must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
• If on the other hand the proceeds are used to completely refund the levy on 
the domestic goods the levy corresponds to a charge having equivalent ef-
fect as a custom duty within the meaning of Art. 30 TFEU.141 
For these reasons, the fact alone that nearly all grey electricity consumed 
in Switzerland is imported doesn’t necessarily mean that a levy on grey 
electricity must be treated as if it were an import tariff. This would howev-
er be the case if the proceeds from the tax were to be used to completely 
refund the tax on the domestically produced grey electricity.  
Secondly, primary EU law in principle does not prohibit a double taxa-
tion.142 As long as the EU legislator has not harmonised the rules govern-
ing a particular tax, an importing EU member state must not take into ac-
count whether a particular good or service has already been taxed in the 
country of export. 
(3) Free movement of goods 
Finally, any national legislation making the import of electricity condition-
al on the production of a GO would have to undergo a review as to its 
compatibility with the rules governing the free movement. This is con-
firmed by an on-going investigation of the European Commission against 
an amendment to the Austrian “Elektrizitätswirtschafts- und -
organisationsgesetz (ElWOG)” which provides that all sales of electricity 
in Austria are conditional on the production of a certificate of origin.    
140  ECJ, Judgement of 23 April 2002, Case C-234/99, Nygard, ECR 2002 I-3676, para. 42 with further references. 
141  ECJ, Judgment of 25 May 1977, Case 77-76, F.lli Cucchi v Avez S.p.A, ECR 1977 987, para. 16 and 19; see also the 
less differentiated statement of the ECR, in the preceding  Judgement of 23 January 1975, Case 51/74, van der Hulst, 
ECR 1975 79, para. 13-17. 
142  See for example ECJ, Judgement of 29 June 1978, Case 142/77, Larsen and Kjerulff, ECR 1978 1543, paras. 33-35; 
Judgement of 27 October 1993, Case C-72/92, Scharbatke, ECR 1993 I-5509, paras. 14 and 15; Judgement of 23 April 
2002, Case C-234/99, Nygard, ECR 2002 I-3676, para. 38. 
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c) Options for taxing imported nuclear electricity under EU law 
EU law does not explicitly deal with a scenario whereby the EU member 
states impose higher levies on electricity from nuclear energy. As ex-
plained above, the tax rates according to the already mentioned Council 
Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community 
framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity apply equally 
to all categories of electricity which do not fall within one of the excep-
tions in favour of “green” electricity, mentioned in Art. 15 (1) b, c and d of 
the Directive (see above). Given that these are minimal tax rates, the Di-
rective does not strictly prevent the member states from imposing higher 
levies on electricity of nuclear origin. To the extent that this results in a 
differentiation compared to electricity from renewable energy, this can in 
all likelihood be justified with reference to the already mentioned practice 
of the ECJ as follows.  
As noted in our earlier legal opinion, the EU member states are in principle 
authorised to use their fiscal sovereignty to apply different tax rates based 
on grounds that are recognised by the EU legal order in order to orientate 
the demand towards certain product groups, as long as this does not result 
in a direct or indirect discrimination against imports.143 As set out in more 
detail in our previous legal opinion, there are clear precedents to the effect 
that a differentiation may in principle be compatible with the non-
discrimination principle applying to internal taxation measures if it is 
based on reasons of environmental policy.144 The ECJ has taken the view 
in its Outokumpu judgment that the member states are not precluded from 
taxing electricity according to a rate which varies  
“according to the manner in which the electricity is produced and the raw 
materials used for its production, in so far as that differentiation is based 
… on environmental considerations.”145  
This case law doesn’t directly concern the case at hand. This is because the 
objectives which may justify a discrimination against electricity from fos-
143 Seiler, in: Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Art. 110 TFEU, para. 31. 
144  See fn. 8 above. 
145 ECJ, Case C-213/96, Outokumpu Oy, ECR 1998 I-1777, para. 31. 
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sil energy do not necessarily apply here. Electricity generation in nuclear 
power plants does not give rise to the same pollution issues as for example 
the operation of coal- or gas-fired plants. However, on closer inspection it 
becomes apparent that the ECJ showed a willingness to recognise other 
policy objectives as legitimate provided they were themselves compatible 
with the requirements of the Treaty and its secondary legislation.146 It is 
therefore encouraging to note that the primary and secondary EU law, such 
as for example in Art. 36 TFEU, recognise the protection of health and life 
of humans, animals or plants as an objective worth pursuing. For these rea-
sons it is in principle defendable to argue that electricity from nuclear en-
ergy should be taxed higher than electricity from renewable sources, for 
example by referring to the need to protect human health from harmful in-
cidents or the long-term effects associated with storing nuclear waste. 
However, the margin of manoeuvre of the member states in this regard 
should not be overstated, given that the European Union has already un-
dertaken significant steps to harmonise the national legislation in this area. 
Art. 30 of the Treaty on the Establishment of the European Atomic Energy 
Community provides that the Union shall define the basic standards for the 
protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dan-
gers arising from ionizing radiation. On the basis of this provision, the 
Council of the EU has adopted Directive 2013/59/Euratom of 5 December 
2013 laying down basic safety standards for the protection against the 
dangers arising from exposure to ionising radiation.147  
It follows that a member state may not assume the right to take measures 
against the operation of nuclear power plants in neighbouring countries 
with the pretention to improve the protection of public health.148 
Similarly, the fact that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Un-
ion (TFEU) recognises the right of the member states to choose “between 
different energy sources” in Art. 194 (2) subpara. 2 TFEU149 and to a cer-
tain extent also in Art. 192 (2) c TFEU, gives a certain comfort to Member 
146 ECJ, Case C-213/96, Outokumpu Oy, ECR 1998 I-1777, para. 30. 
147 OJ 2014 L 13, 1. 
148 ECJ, Case C -115/08, Land Oberösterreich / ČEZ as (Temelin), para. 136. 
149 See Hirsbrunner in Schwarze, EU-Kommentar, 3rd edition 2012, Art. 194 AEUV, para. 29. 
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States wishing to favour the generation of renewable over nuclear energy. 
But again, the margin of manoeuvre resulting from these provisions should 
not be overstated and it is probably fair to say that any differentiated 
treatment must be based on a coherent system, which doesn’t result in an 
unjustified discrimination. 
4.2.3 Interim conclusions from the viewpoint of EU law 
To sum up, an EU member state may not impose an import duty or charge 
having an equivalent effect on imports of electricity from another EU 
member state. The member state concerned may apply a measure of inter-
nal taxation, provided this does not result in indirect discrimination. The 
tax rate must be in line with the provisions of Council Directive 
2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework 
for the taxation of energy products and electricity. According to the “out-
put taxation principle” the levy may not, as a rule, be imposed on the ener-
gy products used for the production of energy. Nonetheless, power plants 
are obliged to participate in the ETS and energy inputs may in future also 
become subject to a CO2 levy. At the current state of the development of 
EU law it is unclear whether the same principles apply to electricity from 
nuclear energy. Finally, a levy is not deemed to be a (prohibited) tariff 
(customs duty) or a charge having equivalent effect simply because it con-
cerns a kind of energy which is not produced domestically.  
4.3 Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA  
Similarly to the situation in the EU described above, the conditions gov-
erning tariffs on imports of goods, including electricity, to Switzerland are 
subject to multilateral trade rules, in particular the WTO and GATT disci-
plines. Moreover, the Swiss–EU bilateral trade relations are governed by 
the FTA Switzerland–EEC of 1972. The relationship between an FTA and 
WTO law has been dealt with in our previous Legal Opinion on Differen-
tiated Electricity Taxation.150 It has been also clarified that the Switzer-
150  See fn. 8 above, at 22-23. 
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land–EEC 1972 FTA applies to trade in electricity as electricity is legally 
defined as a good.151 
4.3.1 Differentiation between tariffs and taxes under the Switzerland–EEC 
1972 FTA  
The Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA, similarly to the EU law, contains sepa-
rate provisions dealing with taxes and tariffs. According to Articles 3 and 
6 of the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA no new custom duties or charges 
having effect equivalent to a customs duty on imports can be introduced in 
trade between Switzerland and the EU. Art. 7 further prohibits introduction 
of export customs duties or charges having equivalent effect. Whereas 
each of the parties to the FTA is free to introduce internal taxation and 
even to replace customs duties of fiscal nature by an internal tax (Art. 4(1) 
Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA), the internal fiscal measures or practices 
should not directly or indirectly discriminate between like products from 
the EU and Switzerland (Art. 18). The interpretation of provisions on cus-
toms duties and internal taxes by Swiss courts is still marginal.152 Howev-
er, the existing decisions explain the difference between taxes as measures 
having equivalent effects to a custom duty and thus prohibited under the 
FTA and taxes as part of internal taxation that are compatible with the 
FTA unless they discriminate between like products.  
In a court case relating to an automobile tax on used Maserati imported in-
to Switzerland, the Swiss Federal Customs Appeal Committee153 found 
that if a tax is charged as part of an internal taxation system and applies 
similarly to both imported and to domestic products it does not constitute a 
measure of equivalent effect. However, it can still be tested for its compat-
ibility with the non-discrimination requirement. The Customs Appeal 
Committee referred to the primary EU law as well as to the relevant ECJ 
case law and accordingly confirmed that if a levy is envisaged as an inter-
nal tax and basically applies both to imported and to domestic like prod-
ucts, it does not fall under the notion of a tariff. Although the automobile 
151  Ibid., at 23. 
152  Th. Cottier et al., Die Reschtsbeziehungen der Schweiz und der Europäischen Union, Stämpfli Verlag, 2014, at 220. 
153  Swiss Federal Customs Appeal Committee was liquidated and most of its functions were vested to the Federal Admin-
istrative Court. 
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tax was indeed imposed as an internal tax, it was applied predominantly to 
imported cars, given that the Swiss domestic production is very small (less 
than 300 cars per year). The Customs Appeal Committee came to the con-
clusion that the cars produced domestically in Switzerland and imported 
from the EU can be considered like products and the automobile tax ap-
plies not only to imported cars but also to domestic production, which 
even if minimal, does exist. Moreover, the Customs Appeal Committee 
took the view that even if there is no domestic production of a certain 
good, this does not necessarily mean that the tax discriminates against im-
ports within the meaning of Articles 18 FTA and III GATT. As the Swiss 
automobile tax was an excise tax that clearly formed a part of an internal 
taxation system applying to domestic and imported cars alike, no discrimi-
natory taxation under Art. 18(1) FTA was found to exist. Moreover, there 
was nothing to suggest that the tax was used as a disguised restriction on 
trade between Switzerland and the EU, since the tax rate was rather low 
(4%) it did not have an impeding impact on imports and thus did not con-
travene the objectives of the FTA.154 
A similar case with respect to an export-related fiscal measure, namely a 
tax on waste, was decided by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in 2005.155 
According to the Swiss environmental legislation, waste is subject to a tax 
both of domestic residue and if it is exported abroad. Depending on the 
types of waste repositories different tax rates applied: for a waste reposito-
ry available in Switzerland the tax rate amounted to 15 Swiss francs per 
tonne, whereas waste exported abroad to the subsurface repositories was 
subject to a considerably higher tax rate of 50 Swiss francs per tonne. The 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court found, similarly to the automobile tax case, 
that taxation of waste (including different tax rates) constitutes a part of 
the internal taxation system in Switzerland. The taxation does not depend 
on the single fact of border crossing and it is based on objective criteria 
which are applied equally to domestic and exported waste.  Consequently 
the tax does not constitute an export duty within the meaning of Art. 7 of 
the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA. Drawing on an analogy with Art. 110 
TFEU the Supreme Court took the view that there is no discrimination as 
154  Entscheid der Eidgenössichen Zollrekurskommission vom 29. August 2001 i.S.S. (ZRK 2000-020), VPB 66.44. 
155  BGE 131 II 271 (Sonderabfallverwertungs-AG (SOVAG) gegen BUWAL und UVEK). 
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long as the domestic tax system is neutral and differences are objectively 
justified. However, due to the lack of evidence it could not determine 
whether a higher tax rate for waste destined for subsurface repositories 
was justified.156 
In light of the clear prohibition on import and export tariffs, the important 
question is whether the exceptions of the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA ap-
ply. Unlike in the WTO law, where, as mentioned above, general excep-
tions pursuant to Art. XX GATT can be invoked as a justification both for 
discriminatory tax measures and most probably for violations of Art. II 
GATT on import duties, the exceptions under Art. 20 Switzerland–EEC 
1972 FTA apply neither to the issues of taxation nor to import or export 
tariffs. The wording of Art. 20 FTA clearly indicates that its application is 
limited to the cases of restrictions (quantitative and non-tariff measures) on 
imports, exports and transit of goods or the equivalent measures. Moreo-
ver, as mentioned in our previous legal opinion, the FTA Switzerland–
EEC does not contain a proportionality requirement for tax measures.157 
4.3.2 Compatibility of a tax on imported electricity stemming from fossil 
fuels and nuclear energy with the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA 
The implementation of a tax on imported electricity, whether CO2-based or 
based on input products, would face the same practical challenges as de-
scribed above. However, it should be noted upfront that the Switzerland–
EEC 1972 FTA does not contain any similar provisions to Art. XXVIII 
GATT that allows deconsolidation of tariff lines, since it is a free trade 
agreement which aims at the highest level of liberalization of trade, and a 
deconsolidation would per se contravene the objective and key provisions 
of the FTA. 
If the implementation of the first two options, i.e. a higher differentiated 
tax on electricity generated from fossil fuels and a tax based on CO2 foot-
print of the electricity, were feasible the key question for determining 
compatibility with the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA would be whether this 
tax results in discrimination against imported electricity. Our conclusions 
156  D. Wüger, Bundesgericht wendet Freihandelsabkommen erstmal unmittelbar an – ein Schritt zurück, Jusletter vom 4. 
April 2005, available at: http://jusletter.weblaw.ch/juslissues/2005/320.html (last visited on 27.05.2014). 
157  See fn. 8 above, at 29. 
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for the first option would be the same as for Options A and B in the previ-
ous legal opinion.158 
Under the current system, where most of the fossil fuel plants do not pay a 
CO2 levy but instead have to comply with the compensation obligation or 
have to participate in the Swiss ETS, the CO2 levy that will apply to im-
ported electricity might raise a number of legal questions. First, as the CO2 
levy on imported electricity will be a part of a well-established taxation 
system, following the available case-law on the Switzerland–EEC 1972 
FTA, the tax would not be considered to constitute a tariff or a measure 
having equivalent effect. Thus, it would be treated under Art. 18 Switzer-
land–EEC 1972 FTA with the key question of whether there is discrimina-
tory tax treatment of imported electricity. Following the above-mentioned 
case-law the revised CO2 levy system, including a tax on imported elec-
tricity, would have to be neutral and be based on objective criteria. Addi-
tional legal risks may arise if Swiss judges refer to the established ECJ 
case law on the matter, which also perceives the final use of tax revenues 
as an important indicator of neutrality.159 Moreover, it is questionable 
whether the measures for differentiating domestic electricity from fossil 
fuels (namely, an obligation to comply with a 100% compensation, or a 
mandatory participation in the ETS, or a voluntary emission reduction tar-
get, or a CO2 levy – depending on the type of fossil fuel plant, as ex-
plained in Section 2.2 could be seen as neutral and objective, whereas the 
imported electricity produced from fossil fuel plants would be subject to a 
CO2 levy. 
The prohibition of discriminatory taxation pursuant to Art. 18 FTA does 
not prohibit double taxation. This is confirmed by the case law of the ECJ 
concerning Art. 110 TFEU which is the counterpart to Art. 18 FTA.160 
However, such double taxation shall not lead to discrimination (direct or 
indirect between like domestic and imported products). Under these cir-
cumstances we doubt that the financial burden imposed by the EU ETS on 
EU electricity suppliers needs to be taken into account by the Swiss tax au-
thorities. In any event, the EU example shows that an emission allowance 
158  See fn. 8 above. 
159  ECR, Judgement of 23 April 2002, Case C-234/99, Nygard, ECR 2002 I-3657 para.42 with further references. 
160  See above. 
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and an energy tax may co-exist. To the extent that there might be incon-
sistencies between the EU ETS and a new Swiss CO2 levy, this may have 
to be dealt with in the on-going negotiations between Switzerland and the 
EU concerning the linking of the two ETS systems. 
Finally, unlike in WTO law, discriminatory tax measures cannot profit 
from the exceptions under Art. 20 of the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA. 
Thus, the imposition of a CO2 levy or an energy tax on imported electricity 
is exposed to more stringent legal provisions under the FTA than under 
WTO law. 
4.3.3 State aid prohibition under the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA 
Similarly to the prohibition of state aid in the EU law, Art. 23(iii) of the 
Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA provides for a prohibition of “any public aid, 
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain un-
dertakings or the production of certain goods”. As addressed in detail in 
the Legal Opinion on Differentiated Electricity Taxation161 it is not clear 
whether both contracting parties intended this Article to apply to state aid 
granted by means of tax exemptions or reductions. Moreover, implicit ex-
ceptions apply to the state aid prohibition in the Switzerland–EEC 1972 
FTA that mainly stem from the EU regulations and communications. To 
sum up, the legal situation is far from clear, however there is certain risk of 
finding that the suggested differentiated taxation constitutes state aid and 
the application of implicit exceptions would depend on the modalities and 
design of the tax. 
  
161  See fn. 8, at p. 32. 
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5 Legal conclusions 
5.1 Consistency with WTO law  
We have analysed three design options for taxing imported fossil fuel elec-
tricity.  
1. Under the first option, an electricity tax would be linked to the source of 
electricity, targeting fossil fuel generation. If green and grey electricity are 
considered to be like or directly competitive products, the enhanced tax 
burden borne by imported electricity could in principle be justified under 
the environmental exceptions foreseen in Art. XX GATT, notwithstanding 
the relatively minor share of fossil fuel electricity in Swiss domestic pro-
duction. If, on the other hand, green and grey electricity are found to be 
unlike products, no discrimination against imported electricity arises so 
long as the amount of domestically produced fossil fuel electricity could 
be considered to be negligible. Yet, whether or not the amount of electrici-
ty currently produced in Swiss fossil fuel plants is negligible is a matter of 
opinion. Also, it necessary to take into account that it may increase in the 
future, replacing nuclear energy supplies. Under these circumstances, it 
seems risky to treat domestic production of electricity from fossil fuels dif-
ferently, also bearing in mind that the FTA with the EU may impose strict-
er standards in this regard. Should Switzerland expand its production of 
grey electricity, which seems likely, then a tax on fossil fuel electricity will 
in any event have to apply equally to domestic and imported grey electrici-
ty. Moreover, this design option faces the implementation problem of trac-
ing the source of imported electricity so long as the EU GO system does 
not provide information on non-RE electricity sources. Finally, we consid-
er it unlikely that such a tax needs to be readjusted for imported EU elec-
tricity in order to take into account the costs incurred by EU electricity 
producers subject to the EU ETS. This is because there are inherent differ-
ences between the electricity tax and the emission allowances obligation 
under the ETS.  
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2. The second option foresees the application of a tax on imported fossil fuel 
electricity based on the CO2 content of electricity. It is an open question 
whether the exemptions granted to domestic fossil fuel plants under the 
current Swiss CO2 Act will also apply to such a future tax. If domestic 
power generation benefits from privileged exceptions, it is unlikely that 
such a tax on the CO2 content could constitute a border tax adjustment 
(BTA) measure consistent with WTO rules. To legally implement a carbon 
BTA on electricity, a CO2 levy in Switzerland should applied to domestic 
fossil fuel power plants without exemptions. This design option also faces 
implementation hurdles, which are mainly due to the fact that the current 
Swiss and EU GO systems do not certify the CO2 content of electricity. 
Finally, the CO2 basis of the tax could provide a compelling reason for the 
emissions costs borne by EU power generators under the EU ETS to be 
taken into account when applying the tax to the electricity imports from 
the EU.  
3. Under the third option, Switzerland could use import tariffs as an instru-
ment to tax imported fossil fuel electricity. This could be implemented 
through deconsolidation of Swiss bound tariffs for electricity based on 
production methods and the introduction of a new tariff lines based upon 
process and production methods. Yet, as tariff deconsolidation is barred 
under the Switzerland-EEC 1972 FTA, there would be no practical effect 
of the measure, as it cannot be applied to the electricity imported from 
Member States of the EU, as well as EFTA countries. Moreover, as in the 
case of the two previous options, it is unclear how the fossil fuel content of 
imported electricity would be traced. It is doubtful whether the current GO 
system could be of practical use in this context.  
Moreover, we addressed the question whether any of the options present-
ed, including a tax on imported nuclear electricity would be compatible 
with the subsidies disciplines under WTO law. We came to the conclusion 
that an energy tax on electricity inputs or a CO2 tax on electricity which is 
imposed only on imported electricity with high probability will constitute a 
subsidy under Articles 1 and 2 of the ASCM. A key element here would be 
whether the adverse effect is exerted on the imported electricity, e.g. where 
imports of electricity from fossil fuels and nuclear power are displaced or 
impeded. The exact answer to the question of compatibility would depend 
on the specific modalities of the measure. 
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Finally, we assessed whether these design options could also be used to tax 
imported nuclear electricity. We came to the conclusion that WTO law 
constraints arise due to the existence of domestic production of nuclear 
electricity in Switzerland, which make the case different to that of taxing 
imported electricity from fossil fuel sources. A comprehensive differenti-
ated electricity tax scheme, which would equally apply to both domestic 
and imported electricity, is thus more suitable for taxing nuclear electrici-
ty.  
5.2 Consistency with EU law 
Switzerland, not being a member of the EU, is not bound by EU law. Nev-
ertheless, Switzerland may have an interest in aligning its own legislation 
with selected aspects of EU law for the reasons that have been set out in 
more detail in our previous legal opinion. 
As explained above, EU member states may not impose any tariffs on the 
import or export of electricity to and from other member states, irrespec-
tive of the particular reason. 
They may impose internal fical levies on electricity but their margin of 
manoeuvre is limited in various respects. 
1. The levy should not result in direct or indirect discrimination against im-
ports. This also extends to the way in which the proceeds from the tax are 
redistributed. If the proceeds are used to refund either partly or completely 
the tax on the domestically produced electricity this may, under certain 
circumstances, result in the measure either being treated like a covert im-
port tariff or a discriminatory tax. 
2. The EU member states may grant tax exemptions or reductions on electric-
ity from renewables, by virtue of Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 Oc-
tober 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of en-
ergy products and electricity. There is risk that such tax exemption or re-
duction could be considered to constitute state aid but this risk seems man-
ageable. In order to ensure compatibility with state aid provisions, the tax 
system must be designed in such a way that the protection of the environ-
ment is one its objectives and there is coherence between the general 
scheme of the tax system and the particular measure.   
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3. In addition, energy products and electricity used to produce electricity are 
in principle exempted from taxation by virtue of the “output taxation prin-
ciple”, although the member states are authorised to deviate from this prin-
ciple for environmental reasons. Notwithstanding the output taxation prin-
ciple, power plants are obliged to participate in the emission trading sys-
tem (ETS). For the time being, the member states are not obliged by EU 
law to take account of the costs incurred by energy companies as a conse-
quence of the ETS when imposing a levy on electricity, although this 
could possibly change in the future. There is also a debate about the intro-
duction of a tax on the CO2 content of energy inputs.  
4. Given that electricity of nuclear origin does not fall under one of the cate-
gories that qualify for a tax exemption or reduction according to the above 
mentioned Directive 2003/96/EC, it can in principle be taxed at a higher 
rate than “green” electricity. Whether or not nuclear electricity can be 
taxed at a higher rate than electricity from fossil fuels is not clear. A tax 
differentiation could possibly be justified by reference to public health 
considerations and the right of the individual member states to decide on 
the appropriate energy mix on their territory. However, the national margin 
of manoeuvre in this regard is limited.   
5.3 Consistency with the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA  
As explained above, currently the key agreement governing bilateral trade 
relations between Switzerland and the EU is the Switzerland–EEC 1972 
FTA. After the preliminary legal analysis we came to the following con-
clusions with respect to compatibility of the proposed taxes or respective 
tariffs on electricity produced from fossil fuels: 
1. Under the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA, similarly to EU law, it is clear that 
no new customs duties or charges having effect equivalent to a customs 
duty on imports can be introduced in trade between the two partners. The 
FTA Switzerland–EEC does not contain any provisions similar to Art. 
XXVIII GATT that allow deconsolidation of tariff lines. As it is a free 
trade agreement, which aims at the highest level of liberalisation of trade, 
such deconsolidation would per se contravene the objective and key provi-
sions of the FTA. The exceptions under Art. 20 FTA Switzerland–EEC do 
not apply to import or export tariffs. 
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2. In general, each of the parties to the FTA is free to introduce internal taxa-
tion and even to replace customs duties of a fiscal nature by an internal tax 
(Art. 4(1) Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA). However, such taxes or other in-
ternal fiscal practices should not directly or indirectly discriminate be-
tween the like products from the EU and Switzerland (Art. 18). As elec-
tricity would be considered a like product, the Swiss tax should be applied 
in a non-discriminatory manner both to Swiss and to imported electricity 
from fossil fuels or nuclear power. Exceptions under Art. 20 Switzerland–
EEC 1972 FTA also do not apply to the issues of taxation. Thus, if the 
CO2 taxation scheme is found to violate Art. 18 Switzerland–EEC 1972 
FTA, there will be no possibility to justify it.  
3. There is a risk of a finding that the suggested differentiated taxation consti-
tutes state aid under the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA and the application 
of implicit exceptions would depend on the modalities and design of the 
tax. 
Our legal analysis of the consistency of all the options outlined with WTO 
law, EU law and the Switzerland–EEC 1972 FTA is summarised in the ta-
ble in Annex 1 below. 
 
6 Political risk assessment 
Introduction of import tariffs on electricity is likely to create political 
problems with the EU, based upon GATT law and the FTA. While the in-
troduction of import tariffs under WTO law would in principle be legally 
possible subject to conditions mentioned above, which would require ne-
gotiations with the EU, the FTA clearly forbids any new import tariffs thus 
excluding this option in relation to the main suppliers in neighbouring 
member states of the EU. One also needs to bear in mind that import tariffs 
would affect economic interests of Swiss market participants, in particular 
the Swiss electricity providers which have conclude long-term supply 
agreements with producers in France and other countries. 
The introduction of a tax is in principle possible but, depending on the 
modalities of such a tax, this could raise political concerns and be compli-
cated in terms of implementation. As mentioned above, currently GOs do 
not contain the information necessary to make it possible to trace the exact 
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CO2 footprint of electricity from fossil sources. If the tax does not distin-
guish according to the CO2 content, this may be easier to implement but 
the effects cannot be calibrated. Thus, in the long-term the whole system 
of the certification of origin of electricity in terms of its inputs might have 
to be adjusted. 
Taxation rates which would substantially reduce imports of fossil fuel 
electricity are likely to be challenged politically. Thus, to a large extent, it 
would be a matter of setting tax rates appropriately. The introduction of a 
new tax in light of the existing Swiss CO2 Act and its comprehensive sys-
tem of various compensation measures apart from a CO2 levy might be 
complicated. Perhaps, one could think in terms of a progressive CO2 levy 
taking into account adjustments made by the EU electricity producers. 
This would also reduce the risks of discriminatory taxation of imported 
electricity from the EU. 
The negotiations on linking the Swiss ETS and EU ETS could be further 
used as an opportunity to set up a coherent CO2 levy system that would not 
discriminate in any manner against foreign electricity producers. The issue 
of mutual recognition and equivalence of the compensation measures 
could be also taken up in the current negotiations of the Electricity Agree-
ment. 
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 7 Annex: Summary table of legal arguments  
 
Measure / Compatibility 
with  
WTO law EU law Switzerland – EEC FTA 
 
Energy tax on electricity 
from fossil fuels 
Violation of Art. III:2 GATT 
if considered like electricity 
products; no violation of con-
sidered unlike electricity 
products based upon differ-
ence in PPMs  
In principle it is possible 
under Directive 2003/96/EC 
(see Art. 14 and 15), but 
should not lead to indirect 
discrimination. Double taxa-
tion is not prohibited by 
primary EU law if tax rules 
are not harmonized. 
In principle possible, but 
should be non-
discriminatory (Art. 18 
Switzerland-EEC FTA). 
Tax has to be neutral and 
based on objective criteria. 
Even if no or marginal 
domestic production, but a 
tax forms a part of internal 
taxation system applying 
to domestic and imported 
goods alike and does not 
have an impeding impact 
on imports. 
Justification under Art. 20 
Switzerland-EEC FTA is 
not possible. 
Violation of state aid rules 
is not excluded. 
Possible justification for vio-
lation of Art. III:2: Art. XX 
(b) and (g) GATT, if: 
- RE and nuclear are 
differentiated vs. fossil 
fuels; 
- If imposed on both 
domestic and imported 
electricity. 
Subsidies: Art. 107(1) 
TFEU (objective of differ-
entiation should be an in-
herent part of the specific 
tax system at hand). Appli-
cation of state aid rules is 
not excluded. As a conse-
quence, a differentiation 
may either be completely 
incompatible or it must be 
adapted to be in conformity 
with the state aid regime. 
 
 
 
CO2 levy on electricity 
 
 
Violation of Art. II:2(a), III:2, 
Ad Art. III GATT 
 
Mind the output tax princi-
ple under Art. 14(1)(a) of 
the Directive 2003/86/EC + 
on-going legislative initia-
tives in the EU. 
Double taxation is not pro-
hibited by primary EU law 
if tax rules are not harmo-
nized. 
 
In principle possible, but 
should be non-
discriminatory (Art. 18 
Switzerland-EEC FTA). 
Tax has to be neutral and 
based on objective criteria. 
Even if no or marginal 
domestic production, but a 
tax forms a part of internal 
taxation system applying 
to domestic and imported 
goods alike and does not 
have an impeding impact 
on imports. 
Justification under Art. 20 
Switzerland-EEC FTA is 
not possible. 
Violation of state aid rules 
is not excluded. 
Possible justification under 
Art. XX(b) and (g) GATT if 
tax is applied to both domestic 
and imported electricity. 
Subsidies: Art. 107(1) 
TFEU (objective of differ-
entiation should be an in-
herent part of the specific 
tax system at hand). 
Application of state aid 
rules is not completely ex-
cluded. As a consequence, a 
differentiation may either be 
completely incompatible or 
it must be adapted to be in 
conformity with the state aid 
regime. 
Subsidies: Determination of 
subsidy is probable (Art. 1 
and 2 ASCM), adverse effect 
depends on modalities (Art. 6 
ASCM); Art. XX GATT does 
not apply. 
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 Import duty on electricity 
from fossil fuels + domestic 
differentiated electricity tax 
system 
 
Violation of Art. II:1(b) 
GATT 
 
Imposition of an import du-
ty or charge having an 
equivalent effect on imports 
of electricity from another 
EU member state is prohib-
ited. 
Differentiation of taxes and 
tariffs, is based on the ob-
jective (exclusively target 
imports or not) and on the 
redistribution of proceeds. 
Lack of domestic production 
of the taxed product does 
not lead to the conclusion 
that such tax constitutes a 
tariff. 
 
 
Prohibited under Art. 3 and 
6 of the Switzerland-EEC 
FTA. 
Justification under Art. 20 
Switzerland-EEC FTA is 
not possible. 
Possible justification under 
(b), (g) and (d), especially if 
combined with domestic dif-
ferentiated electricity tax sys-
tem. 
Deconsolidation of zero tariff 
rates on electricity  under Art. 
XXVIII possible subject to 
compensation  
 
 
Energy tax on imported nu-
clear electricity 
Violation of Art. III:2 GATT Reference to Member States’ 
right to decide on the appro-
priate energy mix and public 
health reasoning may to some 
extent justify differential taxa-
tion; nevertheless risk that 
autonomy of Member States 
in is limited. 
Not  possible: cannot be non-
discriminatory, as there are 
still nuclear power stations in 
operation in Switzerland (Art. 
18 Switzerland-EEC 
Justification under Art. XX is 
not possible 
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Massnahme / 
Vereinbarkeit mit 
… 
WTO-Recht EU-Recht FHA Schweiz  – EU 
Steuer auf 
Stromerzeugung 
aus fossiler 
Energie 
Verstoß gegen Art. III:2 GATT falls der Stromimport als 
Stromprodukt angesehen wird. Kein Verstoß, wenn der  
Strom anhand von differenzierten Produktionsverfahren und 
–methoden als nicht gleichartig angesehen wird. 
Im Prinzip durchführbar unter der Richtlinie 
2003/96/EG (siehe Art. 14 und 15), solange dies 
nicht zu einer indirekten Diskriminierung führt. Eine 
doppelte Besteuerung ist durch primäres EU-Recht 
nicht verboten, solange die Steuerbestimmungen in 
dieser Hinsicht nicht harmonisiert sind. 
Im Prinzip durchführbar, sollte jedoch nicht 
diskriminierend sein (Art. 18 FHA). Abgaben 
müssen neutral und auf objektiven Kriterien 
abgestützt sein. 
Sogar wenn keine oder nur eine marginale 
inländische Produktion besteht, ist die Erhebung 
einer Steuer erlaubt, wenn sie Teil eines 
inländischen Besteuerungssystems ist, dass auf 
inländische und gleichartige importierte Güter 
besteht und sich nicht erschwerend auf Importe 
auswirkt. 
Eine Rechtfertigung nach Art. 20 FHA ist nicht 
möglich. 
Ein Verstoß gegen die Bestimmungen zu 
staatlichen Beihilfen ist nicht ausgeschlossen. 
Mögliche Rechtfertigung des Verstoßes von Art. III:2: Art. 
XX (b), (g) GATT, wenn: 
- erneuerbare und nukleare Energien von fossiler 
Energie differenziert werden; 
- die Steuer sowohl auf dem im Inland produzierten 
und dem im Ausland produzierten Strom erhoben 
wird. 
Staatliche Beihilfen: Art. 107(1) AEUV (Die 
Zielsetzung der Differenzierung sollte ein inhärenter 
Teil des spezifischen Besteuerungssystem sein). 
Es ist nicht vollkommen ausgeschlossen, dass die 
Massnahme als staatliche Beihilfe qualifiziert wird. 
Als Konsequenz daraus, müsste eine Differenzierung 
entweder vollkommen unvereinbar sein oder sie 
müsste angepasst werden, um  mit den EU-
Beihilferecht  übereinstimmend zu sein. 
 
CO2 Abgabe auf 
Strom 
Verstoß gegen Art. II:2(a), III:2, und Art. III GATT. Zu beachten sind der Grundsatz der Ausgangssteuer 
(„output taxation principle“) von Art. 14(1)(a) der 
Richtlinie 2003/96/EG und ferner laufenden 
legislativen Initiativen in der EU. 
Eine Doppelbesteuerung wird durch primäres EU-
Recht nicht verboten, solange die nationalen 
Steuergesetz-gebungen in dieser Hinsicht nicht 
harmonisiert sind. 
Im Prinzip durchführbar, sollte jedoch nicht 
diskriminierend sein (Art. 18 FHA). Abgaben 
müssen neutral und auf objektiven Kriterien 
abgestützt sein. 
Sogar wenn keine oder nur eine marginale 
inländische Produktion besteht, ist die Erhebung 
einer Steuer erlaubt, wenn sie Teil eines 
inländischen Besteuerungssystems ist, dass auf 
inländische und gleichartige importierte Güter 
besteht und sich nicht erschwerend auf Importe 
auswirkt. 
Eine Rechtfertigung nach Art. 20 FHA ist nicht 
möglich. 
Ein Verstoß gegen die Bestimmungen zu 
staatlichen Beihilfen ist nicht ausgeschlossen. 
Mögliche Rechtfertigung nach Art. XX(b), (g) GATT, wenn 
die Abgabe auf inländischen und importierten Strom 
angewendet wird. 
Staatliche Beihilfen: Art. 107(1) AEUV (Die 
Zielsetzung der Differenzierung sollte ein inhärenter 
Teil des spezifischen Besteuerungssystem sein). 
Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, dass die Massnahme als 
staatliche Beihilfe qualifiziert wird. Als Konsequenz 
daraus, müsste eine Differenzierung entweder 
vollkommen unvereinbar sein oder sie müsste 
angepasst wer-den, um  mit den EU-Beihilferecht  
übereinstimmend zu sein. 
Subventionen: Finanzielle Ausgleichsleistungen sind 
wahrscheinlich möglich (Art. 1 und 2 ASCM). Ob eine 
beeinträchtigende Wirkung vorliegt, hängt von den 
Modalitäten ab (Art. 6 ASCM); Keine Anwendung von Art. 
XX GATT. 
 
Anhang: Zusammenfassung der juristischen Diskussion  
  
 
Einfuhrzoll auf 
Stromerzeugung 
aus fossiler 
Energie  
differenziertes 
inländisches 
Stromsteuersystem 
Verstoß gegen Art. II:1(b) GATT. Die Auferlegung von Einfuhrzöllen oder -abgaben, 
welche Auswirkungen auf die Importe von Strom 
aus einem anderen EU-Mitgliedsstaat haben, ist 
verboten. 
Die Zulässigkeit von differenzierenden Abgaben und 
Zöllen hängt vor der Zielsetzung ab (ob sie sich nun 
exklusiv gegen Einfuhren richten oder nicht) und 
gegebenenfalls auch davon, wie die Erträge aus der 
Abgabe verteilt werden. 
Das Fehlen einer inländischen Produktion des 
besteuerten Produkts bedeutet nicht zwingend, dass 
eine solche Steuer einen Zoll darstellt. 
 
Verboten gemäß Art. 3 und 6 FHA. 
Eine Rechtfertigung nach Art. 20 FHA ist nicht 
möglich. Mögliche Rechtfertigung nach (b), (g) und (d), besonders, 
wenn dies mit einem differenziertem Strom-
Besteuerungssystem verbunden wird. 
Eine Entkonsolidierung von Null-Zollsätzen auf Strom 
unter Art. XXVIII führt möglicherweise zu 
Schadenersatzansprüchen. 
 
Abgabe auf 
importierten 
Strom aus 
nuklearer Energie 
Verstoß gegen Art. III:2 GATT. Es liegt in der Zuständigkeit der Mitgliedsstaaten, 
über den angemessenen Energiemix und 
Erfordernisse der öffentlichen Gesundheit auf ihrem 
Staatsgebiet zu entscheiden, woraus sich  
logischerweise unters-chiedliche Besteuerungsarten 
ergeben; dennoch ist die Autonomie der 
Mitgliedsstaaten in dieser Hinsicht beschränkt.  
Nicht möglich: Eine Abgabe nur auf 
importiertem Strom ist zwangsläufig 
diskriminierend, weil in der Schweiz immer 
noch AKWs in Betrieb sind (Art. 18 FHA). 
Eine Rechtfertigung nach Art. XX ist nicht möglich. 
 
  
Mesure /  
Compatibilité avec … 
  Droit de l‘OMC Droit de l‘UE ALE Suisse  – UE 
Imposition de 
production 
d‘électricité à base de 
combustibles fossiles 
Infraction à l’Art. III:2 GATT si les importations 
d’électricité sont considérés comme des produits 
d’électricité. Il n’y a pas d’infraction si l’électricité 
est différenciée sur la base des processus et des 
méthodes de production. 
En principe réalisable d’après la directive 2003/96/CE 
(cf. Art. 14 et 15), pour autant que cela ne conduise pas 
à une discrimination indirecte. Une double imposition 
n’est pas interdite par le droit communautaire primaire 
tant que les dispositions fiscales ne soient pas 
harmonisées. 
En principe réalisable mais ne devrait pas  
être discriminatoire (Art. 18 ALE). Des 
redevances doivent  être neutres et pouvoir 
s’appuyer sur des critères objectifs. 
Même s’il n’y a pas de production au niveau 
national ou que celle-ci n‘est que marginale, 
la perception d’un impôt faisant partie d’un 
système d‘imposition  national perçu sur des 
biens suisses et des produits similaires 
importées est autorisée pour autant qu’il n’y 
a pas d’impacts aggravants sur les 
importations. 
Une justification selon l‘Art. 20 ALE n’est 
pas possible. 
Une infraction contre les règles concernant 
les  aides d’Etat n’est pas exclue. 
Justification potentielle de l’infraction à  l’Art. III:2: 
Art. XX (b), (g) GATT, si: 
- les énergies renouvelables et nucléaires sont 
différenciées de l’énergie fossile; 
- l’impôt est perçu sur la production 
d‘électricité nationale et importée. 
Aides d’Etat: Art. 107(1) TFUE (l’objectif de 
différenciation devrait être une part inhérente du 
système d’imposition). 
L’application d’aides d’Etat n’est pas exclue. En 
conséquence, la différenciation pourrait soit être 
complètement incompatible soit devrait  être adaptée 
afin d’être conforme avec le régime d’aides d’Etat.  
Redevance de CO2 sur 
l’électricité 
Infraction à l‘Art. II:2(a), III:2 et l‘Art. III GATT. En vertu du principe de la taxe en aval de l‘Art. 14(1) 
(a) de la directive 2003/96/CE et d’initiatives 
législatives existantes au sein de l‘UE, une  double 
imposition n’est pas interdite par le droit 
communautaire primaire si les normes fiscales ne sont 
pas harmonisées. 
En principe réalisable mais ne devrait pas  
être discriminatoire (Art. 18 ALE). Des  
redevances doivent  être neutres et pouvoir 
s’appuyer sur des critères objectifs. 
Même s’il n’y a pas de production au niveau 
national ou que celle-ci n‘est que marginale, 
la perception d’un impôt faisant partie d’un 
système d‘imposition  national perçu sur des 
biens suisses et des produits similaires 
importées est autorisée pour autant qu’il n’y 
a pas d’impacts aggravants sur les 
importations. 
Une justification selon l‘Art. 20 ALE n’est 
pas possible. 
Une infraction contre les règles concernant 
les aides d’Etat n’est pas exclue. 
Justification potentielle d‘après l‘Art. XX (b), (g) 
GATT, si la redevance est perçue sur l‘ électricité 
suisse et importée. 
Aides d’Etat: Art. 107(1) TFUE (l’objectif de 
différenciation devrait être une part inhérente du 
système d’imposition). 
L’application d’aides d’Etat n’est pas exclue. En 
conséquence, la différenciation pourrait soit être 
complètement incompatible soit devrait  être adaptée 
afin d’être conforme avec le régime d’aides d’Etat. 
Subventions: Des subventions d’équilibre sont 
probablement possibles (Art. 1 et 2 ASCM).  L’effet 
défavorable dépend des modalités d’application  (Art. 
6 ASCM); Pas d’application de l‘Art. XX GATT. 
 
Annexe : Tableau récapitulatif de l’argumentaire juridique  
  
 
Droit d‘entrée sur  
production 
d‘électricité à base de 
combustibles fossiles 
+ un système 
d’imposition 
d’électricité national  
Infraction à l‘Art. II:1(b) GATT. L’imposition de taxes et de redevances d’importations 
qui auraient des effets sur les importations d’électricité 
d‘un Etat membre de l’Union est interdite. 
Une différenciation de redevances et de droits de 
douane peut être admissible si elle est basée sur 
l‘objectif (qu’elles s’opposent  exclusivement à des 
importations ou non) et, le cas échéant, sur la 
redistribution des rendements de la redevance. 
L’absence d‘une production nationale du produit soumis 
à l‘impôt ne conduit pas à la conclusion qu’une telle 
taxation représente un droit de douane. 
 
Interdit  d‘après les Art. 3 et 6 ALE. 
Une justification d‘après l’Art. 20 ALE n’est 
pas possible. Justification potentielle d‘après (b), (g) et (d), surtout 
s’il y a une combinaison avec un système 
d’imposition d’électricité différencié. 
Une déconsolidation  de droits nuls sur l’électricité 
d‘après l‘Art. XXVIII pourrait éventuellement mener 
à des demandes de dommages et intérêts. 
 
Redevance sur l‘ 
d’électricité nucléaire 
importée 
Infraction à l‘Art. III:2 GATT. Il convient aux Etats membres de conclure au bouquet 
énergétique approprié et à la santé publique sur leurs 
territoires. Logiquement, il en résulte de différents 
modes d’impositions. Malgré tout, l’autonomie des 
Etats membres à cet égard est limitée. 
Pas possible : La redevance ne peut pas être 
non-discriminatoire car des centrales 
nucléaires sont toujours en service en Suisse 
(Art. 18 ALE). 
 
Une justification d‘après l’Art. XX n’est pas possible. 
 
